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ABSTRACT
The Method of Division and Aristotle’s Criticism
of Platonic Philosophy. (May 2010)
Robert Fuselier Howton, B.A., Louisiana State University
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Robin Smith
This thesis investigates Aristotle’s criticism and consequent reformulation of the
Platonic method for formulating definitions called the Method of Division. For both
Plato and Aristotle, the object of division is a natural kind, which consists in a class
whose members stand in a homologous relationship to a single form. I argue that
Aristotle’s criticisms of the Method of Division fall under two categories: logical
objections and ontological objections. The logical objections focus on division as a
method for demonstrating definitions, a method that Aristotle wants to distinguish
from his syllogistic logic, the centerpiece of his theory of scientific demonstration. The
ontological objections focus on the question of whether the sort of account generated
by division is sufficient to constitute a definition of its object. Aristotle’s revised
Method of Division is supposed to avoid the problems he raises by constructing
definitions that satisfy the principles motivating his ontological objections through
a logical process devised to make the resulting account a ‘necessary’ consequence of
the initial assumptions of the division.
I argue that Aristotle’s ontological objections to the Method of Division reflect a
deeper disparity between the Platonic and the Aristotelian notion of a form and nat-
ural kind. Underpinning Aristotle’s notion of a natural kind is an ontology of discrete
substances. Because the unity of substance is paramount in this ontology, Aristotle
iv
argues that a definition, which is supposed to give an account of the essence of a sub-
stance, must account for the unity of its object by itself possessing a non-accidental
unity. Yet, on a Platonic ontology, a definition by division invokes a plurality of
independent Forms whose conjunction does not constitute a unity. On the basis of
this consideration, Aristotle argues that an ontology of abstract Forms cannot ac-
count for the unity of an individual substance. To this extent, I conclude, Aristotle’s
methodological objections to the Platonic Method of Division are a component of
his broader criticisms of Platonic metaphysics.
vFor my family
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11. INTRODUCTION
“I myself am fond of these divisions and collections,
Phaedrus, so that I may be able to speak and understand.”
Plato, Phaedrus 266b
One major concern for contemporary metaphysicians and philosophers of science is
whether the concepts that inform our colloquial and technical vocabularies accurately
reflect the organizational structure of reality. When we divide and classify, how can
we be sure that we are carving nature at its joints? That this concern was shared
by Plato and his successors in the early Academy is evidenced by the Method of
Division (διαίρεσις), a procedure for formulating definitions by positing a kind into a
comprehensive genus which is then successively divided until the kind to be defined
is reached. As early as the Phaedrus, Plato identifies division as the activity of
the dialectician, who “is capable of discerning a single thing that is also by nature
capable of encompassing many” (266b; tr. Nehamas and Woodruff). As such, the
method is a prominent feature of his later metaphysical investigations, the purpose
of which is to search for and offer a clear account of what a thing is (e.g., Sph.
218b–c). Aristotle is highly critical of division as a method of deduction, calling it
“a sort of weak syllogism” the value of which is misunderstood and exaggerated by
its practitioners (An. Pr. 46a31-39). Yet he sees enough value in it as a procedure
This thesis follows The Chicago Manual of Style.
2for discovering “what is predicated in what a thing is” (An. Post. 96a22-23) to offer
conditions on which a division becomes “necessary” (91b28-32).
The goal of this thesis is to investigate the development of the notion of division
in Plato and Aristotle, in an effort to understand the nature of their disagreement
over the value of this method. In particular, I will examine the connection between
division and the metaphysical commitments underpinning Plato and Aristotle’s in-
compatible views on definition, with the intention of situating Aristotle’s polemics
against the Method of Division within his more general criticism of Platonic phi-
losophy. This examination will require a discussion of Platonic division, as well as
an analysis of Aristotle’s critique of the method. It will also require a discussion of
Aristotle’s revisions of the Method of Division, with a particular focus on how these
revisions are designed to resolve the flaws he observes in Platonic division.
In the first section, I will consider the structure of Platonic divisions. The central
problem will concern the object of Plato’s divisions: what exactly is Plato dividing?
Some scholars suggest that the object of division is an abstract, intensional Form,
while others argue that it is rather the extension of an abstract Form. There are
difficulties attending both views. I will argue for an alternative reading on which
a successful application of the Method of Division has as its object a natural kind,
that is, a class of disparate particulars (either less comprehensive kinds or sensible
objects) unified under a Form that typifies their common nature. Division exploits
this unique property of natural kinds—i.e., their connection to abstract Forms—by
establishing logical relations between kinds that parallel ontological relations among
the Forms. A definition generated by division makes a true predication by accurately
mapping relevant connections among the Forms. Underpinning the Method of Divi-
sion, therefore, is a rich theory of connections between Forms and their relationship
to true and meaningful statements, which Plato develops in the Sophist. Accord-
3ingly, when in the Statesman Plato offers guidelines for proper division, they are
designed to aid the divider in selecting differentiae that separate naturally unified
kinds. I will suggest that, although the interpretation of Platonic division developed
in this section alleviates some of the difficulties attending the purely intensional or
extensional interpretations, it highlights many problems with the deductive power
of Platonic division. In particular, it will become apparent that Platonic division
proceeds on a series of assumptions comprising the Collection phase of the method.
The second section will focus on Aristotle’s reception of the Method of Divi-
sion. I argue that there are two distinct aspects of Aristotle’s criticism of division,
one stemming from his theory of scientific demonstration, and another stemming
from his commitment to a substance ontology. This section will address the first
of these aspects. In the Topics, likely an early work, Aristotle seems well versed in
division. He offers advice for proper divisions and formalizes relationships between
genera, species, and differentiae. But in the Analytics he issues sharp criticisms of
the method, contrasting the strengths of his own analytic method of demonstration
with the shortcomings of division. In particular, division is faulted for lacking the de-
ductive necessity of syllogistic deductions that is the cornerstone of the Aristotelian
conception of scientific demonstration. Moreover, Aristotle argues that division is
incapable of demonstrating what it sets out to demonstrate, namely definitions. He
argues that, not only is division ill-suited to the task of demonstration, but that
definitions are of a class of indemonstrable propositions that are accessible in a man-
ner distinct from demonstrative science. Despite these objections, however, Aristotle
maintains that a division, performed properly, can be a reliable means of arriving at
definitions. In this section I will detail Aristotle’s criticisms of division in his logical
and biological works—the Analytics and Parts of Animals. The discussion will open
a question about Aristotle’s motivation for one of his requirements for successful di-
4vision, namely that the resulting definition should be necessary and possess a basic
unity.
In the final section, this question will be addressed by considering his discussion
of substance and definition by division in Metaphysics VII.12. In this discussion, it
will become apparent that Aristotle’s demand for the unity of a definition stems from
his claim that definition is the formula of a compound substance, a central point of
contention with the Platonic theory of Forms. This point will be illustrated by an
examination of an objection to the Platonic notion of a kind given in Metaphysics
VIII.6. I will suggest that, just as Platonic definition relies on a theory of predication
grounded in his ontology of Forms, Aristotle’s account of definition is grounded
in his substance ontology, on which the form of an individual substance is wholly
present in it. Thus, Aristotle’s reformulation of the Method of Division may be
seen as an attempt to make it consistent with his own metaphysics. I conclude that
Aristotle’s criticism of division is not only a polemic aimed at championing his own
theory of demonstration, but, so far as it is premised on a view of definition and
predication radically different from Plato’s, is an integral part of his rejection of
Platonic metaphysics, and in particular the Platonic theory of Forms.
52. THE STRUCTURE OF PLATONIC DIVISIONS
The method of dialectical argumentation characteristic of many of Plato’s later
dialogues—its presence is most notable in the Sophist and Statesman, but on some
accounts the same method is at work in the Philebus1—is simple in its basic struc-
ture, but difficult to interpret and understand. This method, which we might call
the Platonic Method of Division (MD),2 proceeds roughly as follows: the divider
searches for some class (γένος) or kind (εἶδος) for which an account (λόγος) is to be
given by, first, locating it within a broader class or kind and, second, distinguishing
it from the other classes or kinds subsumed under it though successive, usually di-
chotomous divisions intended to separate distinct parts (μέρη) of the divided kind or
class. When the division terminates at a part containing only the definiendum kind
or class, the divider ought to be in possession of a “completely adequate” (παντάπασι
[...] ἱκανω˜ς, Sph. 221c) account of it, which consists in a recapitulation or “weaving-
together” (συμπλέξαντες, e.g., at Ibid. 268c) of the steps of the division, beginning
with the comprehensive kind under which the definiendum is initially located and
ending with the final differentia that delimits the part containing only it from its
closest neighboring part(s).3
1Hampton, for instance, sees an affinity between the ‘Divine Method’ presented in Philebus 16
ff. and the method of the Sophist and Statesman. See her 1990, 35 ff.
2The procedure is referred to in the Sophist as a method (μέθοδος) by which to search for
(ζητε˜ιν) and give a clear account (ἐμφανίζειν) of what it is (τι΄ ποτ’ ἔστι) that one seeks (Sph. 218b–
219a; cf. Plt. 258c, where similar language is employed to describe the procedure carried out in the
investigation of the statesman). It is not until later, perhaps beginning with Aristotle, that this
method receives its name, the Method of Division. Cf. An. Post. II.5, 91b12; Aristotle actually
refers to it as “the method through divisions” (ἡ διὰ τω˜ν διαιρέσεων ὁδός).
3So, e.g., the Stranger’s account of the angler (or the expertise of angling): “Of the whole
of expertise one half-part was acquisitive; half of acquisitive was subduing; half of subduing was
6It is immediately clear that MD relies on a part-whole relationship between
kinds. Division distinguishes various parts of a given whole, and proceeds by mak-
ing finer distinctions within those various parts until one finds a part that encloses
only the definiendum. But one soon runs into difficulty explicating this part-whole
relationship. The task of MD is to formulate an adequate account of some specified
εἶδος—usually translated as ‘form’ or ‘kind’. Some scholars take the object of MD to
be an abstract, monadic Form complete with all the ontological baggage Plato sad-
dles that term with in earlier dialogues like the Republic.4 It would follow that MD
functions to establish determinate relations among the Forms, the relevant combina-
tions of which constitute an account of the definiendum. But if Plato understands
himself to be dividing intensional entities like Forms, the part-whole relationship that
must obtain for MD to work seems the inverse of what we should expect. For, if
statesmanship were a kind of knowledge, one would expect that the Form Knowledge
would be a part of the Form Statesmanship, since ‘kind of knowledge’ is included
in the definition of statesmanship, but statesmanship is not necessarily included in
the definition of knowledge. Yet, according to the definition formulated by MD,
statesmanship is a part of knowledge, and not the other way around.5 If Plato is
dividing intensional entities, the part-whole relationship he has in mind seems to be
hunting; half of hunting was animal-hunting; half of animal-hunting was water-hunting; the whole
lower portion of water-hunting was fishing; half of fishing was striking; half of striking was hooking;
and the part of this [i.e., hooking] that involves striking a blow that draws up something from
below has a name comparing with the action itself, called ‘angling’, for which we have just now
been searching” (Sph. 221b–c). In some cases Plato seems to abbreviate the resulting account to
the immediate differentia of the definiendum, as when the Stranger reviews the first six divisions of
the sophist (231d–e)—i.e., “some kind of merchant of learning about the soul,” which is supposed
to summarize the second division of the sophist (231d). Yet each of these six divisions is found
to be inadequate because it fails to generate agreement about the precise nature of the sophistic
expertise. For this reason these formulations are compared to appearances rather than accounts of
what the sophist is; this might suggest that the resulting abbreviated accounts are insufficient to
capture the sophist.
4Among those who accept this view are Solmsen (1968), Vlastos (1973, 302-305), and especially
Moravcsik (1973).
5See Cohen 1973, 190 f.
7counterintuitive.
This consideration against the intensional model of MD recommends a model
that preserves a more intuitive reading of the part-whole relationship. Some schol-
ars have accepted a model of Platonic division that can be explicated in terms of
basic set-theoretical notions.6 On this sort of model, the part-whole relationship is
the familiar relationship of class inclusion. Thus statesmanship, for instance, is a
part of knowledge in virtue of the fact that the class of statesmen (or, alternatively,
instances of statesmanship) is a subclass of the class of knowledge. But then Plato
cannot be dividing intensional entities like Forms, but rather a class of individuals
(e.g., kinds or instances of knowledge). On this model, then, MD divides the exten-
sion of a Form, rather than a Form itself. But while this extensional model might
accommodate an intuitive understanding of the part-whole relationship, it seems to
obscure how MD functions to furnish a definition of some class or kind. If, as this
model must maintain, Plato is dividing classes of particulars, it would seem that co-
extensive Forms would have the same definition.7 Yet Plato does not want to say, for
instance, that the Forms of Wisdom, Courage, Temperance, and Justice as given in
the Republic,8 or indeed the all-pervasive “greatest kinds” of the Sophist—in particu-
6See Cohen 1973, who seems to champion what he calls the ‘superclean model’ of division, Wedin
1990, and Cavini 1995. For the sake of simplicity, I will be referring only to Cohen’s ‘superclean
model’ as the extensional model of MD.
7Cf. Cohen 1973, 184: “If dividing a form A is just dividing its extension into subclasses, it
would seem to follow that if two Forms are extensionally equivalent, to divide one is to divide the
other.” Cf. Moravcsik 1973, 338.
8See, e.g., Republic IV, where Plato distinguishes three different virtues—Courage, Temperance,
and Wisdom—to correspond to the three different parts of the soul. The fourth virtue, Justice,
is explained as the proper relationship of ruler and ruled between the parts of the soul. The just
person, moreover, in maintaining the proper relationship between the parts of the soul, will in turn
possess all the other virtues. Plato concludes here that “there is one form (εἶδος) of virtue” (445c).
In the Protagoras Plato reaffirms the thesis that virtue is one, but goes on to refute the claim that
there are distinct parts of virtue (329d–e). He concludes that the five virtues (these four plus Piety)
are five names for the same thing (349b), so that all virtue is a species of knowledge (361b). It
might be wondered, then, whether Plato’s idea of virtue is different in the Republic and Protagoras.
The discussion of this section will shed some light on this question, so this issue will be taken up
again below (see note 32).
8lar Being, Sameness, and Difference—are identical just because they are exemplified
by the same individuals.
Thus, there are serious problems attending both the intensional and extensional
models of MD. If it is maintained that Platonic division aims to give an account
or definition of a given Form, it becomes difficult to explain the part-whole relation
that his method exploits. But if one tries to explicate this relation in terms of
the familiar set-theoretic notion of class inclusion, one faces problems relating to
how MD could formulate distinct definitions of coextensive Forms. In the following
pages, I will try to alleviate some of these difficulties by developing a model of MD
on which the definiendum is not a purely intensional or extensional Form, but a term
or definite description that designates a natural kind (εἶδος). Plato understands a
natural kind to be unique in that it comprises both a class of particulars that share a
likeness and an abstract Form that typifies that likeness. Platonic division depends
on this correlation between Form and class because it proceeds by mapping relations
among natural kinds. In virtue of this correlation, the logical relations obtaining
among natural kinds point to ontological relations among the Forms, and because
Plato insists that true statements make predications that correspond to real relations
among the Forms, it is only divisions that distinguish and make connections between
natural kinds that generate definitions. As a method for dividing natural kinds, MD
is designed to track the ontological relationships that constitute adequate definitions.
To explicate this model, we will turn first to Plato’s remarks on MD in the
Phaedrus, Sophist, and Statesman. After developing a preliminary model of the
method, we will look at how MD develops out of Plato’s earlier accounts of the
relationship between Forms and classes, and how it correlates with an account of
predication presented in the Sophist. We will see that, in order reliably to cut nature
at its joints,MD depends crucially on the unique nature of natural kinds, so much so
9that Plato takes steps toward formalizing the procedure by establishing guidelines for
dividing in such a way that one distinguishes parts corresponding to natural kinds.
2.1 Outlines of the Method of Division
Perhaps the earliest reference to MD in Plato’s dialogues occurs at Phaedrus 265d–
266d, where it is described in connection with the ability to see “a single thing that
is also by nature capable of encompassing many,” (tr. Nehamas and Woodruff)9 an
ability Socrates identifies with the expertise of the dialectician. As it is presented
here, the method consists of two component operations called Collection (Συναγωγή)
and Division (Διαίρεσις). Collection consists in “grasping together things scattered
about in many places to bring them to a single form (ἰδέαν), so that by defining
each you always make clear what you wish to teach” (265d). By contrast, Division
consists in cutting up the class brought together in Collection “according to kinds
(κατ’ εἴδη)” and “along its natural joints,” that is, without fragmenting any class by
means of arbitrary distinctions. Later in the dialogue, Socrates concludes that by
using this method the dialectician is able to give “discourse together with knowledge”
(276e–277a) by knowing how to “define everything in itself” and “cut according to
kinds until one reaches what is indivisible (ἀτμήτου)” (277b–c).10
9Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own. My translations of Plato are based on
Burnet 1967–8, and my translations of Aristotle are based on Louis 1956, Minio-Palnello 1966, and
Ross 1968, 1970a, 1970b. All other translations of Plato are taken from Cooper and Huchinson
1997, and all other translations of Aristotle, unless otherwise noted, are from Barnes 1984.
10Does Plato think that kinds are essentially divisible or indivisible, or is this an ad hoc property of
kinds that depends on the purposes to which the divider puts them? Gill (forthcoming) argues that
whether or not a division makes proper cuts is entirely determined by the intention of the divider:
“The target at the bottom of the tree—however vague or even misguided the initial conception of
it—determines the selection of the wide kind at the start, the proper first division, and relevant
next steps. Different target kinds (the angler, the sophist, the statesman) prompt the investigators
to carve up the world in different ways. [...] Thus what counts as a ‘natural joint’ (Phdr. 265e1-3;
cf. Plt. 262a9-b2), a proper break between kinds, depends on the goal of the investigation” (20).
It follows on this view that a kind is indivisible only insofar as the purposes of the division do not
require it to be divided. I disagree with this claim for two reasons. First, Plato evidently thinks
some cuts are illicit. In the Statesman, for instance, Plato will advise against making divisions that
10
As it is presented in the Phaedrus, a successful application of MD is supposed to
establish a connection between a broader (generic) kind and the subordinate kinds
contained in it. After it is collected into a single common kind (ἕν τι κοινῇ εἴδος),
Socrates’ division of madness (μανία) distinguishes it into two broad kinds, divine-
and human-caused, and locates the target kind, love (ἔρως), under the divine part
of madness. The division of the divine part of μανία reveals two kinds of ἔρως that
are distinct despite sharing a name. Only one kind of ἔρως is divine, and in virtue
of the distinction revealed through Division, Socrates can “hold it out and praise it
as a cause of our greatest goods” while discarding the lesser (“left-handed,” σκαιόν)
kind of love (266b). Thus, if the division is performed correctly, distinguishing parts
according to actual kinds and not attempting to make distinctions which are not
really there, it should be able to separate all the parts of the broader kind and
eliminate the equivocations that homonymous terms engender.11
From Plato’s brief remarks it is apparent that Division is concerned with giving
definitions. By subsuming disparate kinds under a common class like μανία, Collec-
tion aims to provide a definition of what it gathers together. That is, whatever is
subsumed under the kind μανία is thereby defined as a part or kind of μανία. By pay-
separate one unified class but leave behind a disordered collection. It would follow that what counts
as a natural joint would be determined by the nature of the divided kind rather than the divider’s
intentions. Second, as I will argue in § 2.3, it is essential to Plato’s theory of predication that
there be determinate relations among the Forms. If such properties as divisibility and parthood are
merely ad hoc devices for facilitating division, it is unclear how MD would be able to formulate
a true definition of its object. If there are determinate relations among the Forms, on the other
hand, there also will be determinate relations among natural kinds. Then whether a kind has
subordinate kinds as parts would not be contingent upon what part that kind plays in a division.
To the contrary, one goal of MD would be to determine whether a given kind has parts, such that
it is or is not subject to further division.
11If this interpretation is correct, then Plato is here foreshadowing Aristotle’s formal discussion
of homonymy in Topics I.15. Among Aristotle’s suggestions for identifying homonymous terms, he
states that whether or not a term is used homonymously may be determined by what objects it
denotes. If in any two cases the term denotes a distinct set of objects, then the term admits of
two different accounts and so is homonymous. Socrates’ distinction between the human and divine
kinds of ἔρως might be seen to fit this description.
11
ing attention to the kinds subsumed under the comprehensive class, Division aims to
distinguish its various parts. As a result, the kind of ἔρως Socrates seeks is defined,
not only as a kind of μανία, but as a divine μανία, since Division discovers it as a kind
that falls under the divine part of μανία. Stated generally, Plato’s account of MD in
the Phaedrus proceeds as follows: for any set of indivisible kinds K = {k1, . . . , kn}
collected under a superordinate divisible kind F, Collection defines any subordinate
kind ki ∈ K as an F-kind, while Division identifies differentiae (i.e., subordinate di-
visible kinds) within F, F 1 . . . Fn, allowing further classifications under a differentia
F m, Fm1 . . . Fmn , and more precise definitions of subordinate kinds (i.e., ki = dfFmi).
Finer divisions yield more precise classifications and definitions. When the dialecti-
cian reaches the indivisible definiendum, we may presume, the definition is complete
(see Figure 1).12
F
F1 F2
F 2a F 2b (=df ki)
Figure 1: The Phaedrus Model of MD
Like the Phaedrus, the divisions of the Sophist and Statesman are meant to give
a defining account of what is sought by the dividers. In the Sophist the Stranger
12This notation is not meant to suggest that there is a categorical distinction between a subor-
dinate kind and the differentiae of the superordinate kind. Presumably, the differentia F1, which
classifies subordinate kinds, is itself an F-kind. There is, however, a relevant distinction between
the sort of kind F1 is and an indivisible kind that has no further subordinate kinds. This distinction
rests on the fact that the members of a divisible kind are subordinate kinds, whereas the members
of an indivisible kind are particulars themselves (I can find no other sense than this in Plato’s
phrase “indivisible kind,” but see note 10 above). Thus, insofar as the definiendum is indivisible, it
will be distinct from its superordinate kinds of which it is a part and which comprise its definiens.
12
proposes to initiate the investigation into the differences between the sophist, states-
man, and philosopher, beginning with the sophist, by “searching for him and giving
a clear account (λόγῳ) of what he is (τί ποτ’ ἔστι)” (218b–c). Once again the aim is
to avoid equivocations between kinds engendered by homonymous terms: “in every
case it is necessary to agree about the thing itself (τὸ πρα˜γμα αὐτό) by means of
explanations (διὰ λόγων), rather than a name alone, apart from the account” (218c).
Before attempting to give an account of the sophist, the Stranger performs a division
of the angler as a model (παράδειγμα) for the method by which he and Theaetetus
will investigate the sophist.13 When the angler (or angling) is found among the parts
of expertise (τέχνη), the Stranger declares that they have come to an agreement on
the angler’s expertise and “sufficiently grasped the account concerning the thing itself
(περὶ αὐτὸ τοὖργον)” (221b). The account he offers enumerates the steps of the di-
vision connecting the expertise of angling to the whole of expertise. Similarly, when
the Stranger undertakes to give an account of the statesman, he begins his search
by positing the statesman as someone who has knowledge and proceeds to divide
knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) into distinct classes (Plt. 258b ff.). Though this division is
ill-fated—it yields a final differentia incapable of distinguishing statecraft from other
kinds of ἐπιστήμη like farming and medicine (276e–268a)—its aim is to produce an
account of the statesman similar to that of the sophist, an enumeration of the parts
of knowledge that link statesmanship to knowledge as a whole (267a–c). What Plato
is looking for in an account of a kind, it seems, is nothing other than a complete
division of it.
In the sort of account generated by MD, the successive differentiae that separate
parts of the divided kind also connect the definiendum (e.g., love, angling) to the
superordinate divided kind (e.g., madness, expertise) that it is collected under, and
13Cf. Plt. 285d–286b. On the role of models in MD, see Gill 2006 and 2009.
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this connection comprises its definition. But if collecting and defining kinds is the
task of the dialectician, MD appears to be a poor tool for the job. Plato notes that
dividing according to kinds and “along natural joints” is a condition for a successful
division, but what assurance does the method offer that the divisions one makes
will not fragment a unified kind? In other words, how are we to tell a natural kind
from an unnatural or fragmented kind? Moreover, what assurance does the method
give that a kind located under one differentia does not fit equally well under another
differentia? As it is presented in the Phaedrus,MD lacks any guidelines along which
a successful operation could be differentiated from an unsuccessful one. Indeed, in
this text Plato himself is apprehensive of the reliability of Collection and Division:
Socrates says of his definition of ἔρως that, whether or not it is correct, it at least
made the speech consistent and smooth, and he notes the need to formalize Collection
and Division into a expert discipline (265d).
In the next section it will become clear that Plato needs rules for distinguishing
natural kinds from unnatural or fragmented kinds and proper ordering of differentiae.
When he returns to Division in other dialogues he will attempt to furnish MD with
such rules. These rules will depend on a crucial relationship between terms and
abstract Forms that Plato formulates in the Republic, and which informs his account
of definition, but is forced to reconsider in light of developments in his subsequent
metaphysics. To understand how Plato will make MD a more reliable means of
classifying and defining kinds, then, we must take a closer look at what a definition
is for Plato and how his account depends on the relationship between Forms and
terms.
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2.2 Forms and natural kinds
The dialogues featuring MD, and in particular the Statesman, represent a refor-
mulation of one of Plato’s characteristic doctrines. In Republic X, Plato notes a
basic connection between the words we use and the abstract entities that unify the
disparate objects to which those words refer:
Then do you want us to start our investigation here following the usual
method? For we have been accustomed to posit (τίθεσθαι) some single
Form (εἶδος) for each of the many things that we give the same name
(ταὐτόν ὄνομα ἐπιφέρομεν). (596a)
In the Republic, Plato’s “usual method” of inquiry consists in positing a single Form
to correspond to a class of particulars called by the same name. The Form functions
as a principle of unity for the class of particulars denoted by the same term. To take
Plato’s own example, though there is a plurality of things called ‘bed’, there is only
one Bed in nature:
The god either did not want to, or some necessity set upon him not to
make any more than one bed in nature, so he made only the one itself,
what a bed is. [...] If he made only two, again one would appear whose
form both of these would have, and this one, but not the other two, would
be what a bed is. (597b–d)
Corresponding to the term ‘bed’ there is an abstract, eidetic Bed that unifies the
class of disparate particulars to which it refers. Everything (properly) called ‘bed’ is
so called in virtue of having in common the form of a bed, and this form is typified
by the single eidetic Bed. Without this formal unity, there would be no principle in
virtue of which two disparate objects are both (properly) called beds. Consequently,
argues Plato, were there only two disparate beds, they would both be called ‘bed’ in
virtue of sharing the form of some third bed, which would then be Bed itself, what
it is to be a bed. Therefore, the objects that the term ‘bed’ refers to are unified
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under a single εἶδος so far as each in some capacity possesses the essential form of
bed, which is reified as the eidetic Bed.
Call the “usual method” of the Republic the Naive Method of Collection (NM).
According to it, there is a strict one-to-one correspondence between general terms
and abstract Forms. For every general term ‘t ’ there is a corresponding Form T
whose extension contains the totality of t-objects, such that every particular t-object
is properly so called in virtue of possessing the form typified in the eidetic T.14 I
call this method naive because it is premised on a claim that Plato will call into
question in subsequent works, that the general terms we use reliably denote natural
kinds. Stated otherwise, NM works only if two critical assumptions prove to be
true: (i) that the extension of the eidetic T, the class of t-objects, contains no more
than the class of objects denoted by the general term ‘t ’, and (ii) every term ‘t ’
exhaustively denotes the class of t-objects, all of which are so called in virtue of
possessing the form embodied by the eidetic T. If (i) is false, there will be some case
in which the extension of a Form contains an object that the corresponding general
term does not commonly denote. If (ii) is false, there will be some case in which
a general term denotes some object that does not possess the form typified in the
Form corresponding to that term. If either assumption fails, NM will be prone to
identifying a class as a natural kind when it is really an unnatural or fragmented
class, or identifying a natural as an unnatural or fragmented class when in reality it
possesses a natural unity. Ultimately, Plato will reject both of these assumptions.
14Cf. Vlastos 1973, 270 ff. On Vlastos’ reading, every sentence in ordinary language corresponds
to an “ontologically revealing” sentence that “purports to disclose the ontological basis of its [the
ordinary language sentence’s] meaning and truth” (271). The sentence ‘Socrates is wise’ is true if
and only if it is true that Socrates participates in Wisdom. My account adds that an independent
term can be a bearer of meaning insofar as it corresponds to a natural kind, which is cashed out in
the Republic as a correspondence between a general term and an abstract intensional entity, i.e., a
Form.
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The Phaedrus provides evidence that Plato’s rejection of NM and subsequent
development of MD is motivated in part by a reconsideration of assumption (i).
Socrates’ division of μανία reveals that the general term ‘ἔρως’ indicates at least
two distinct kinds of ἔρως. The term, in other words, indicates a class of objects
which may be differentiated into two distinct natural kinds. This discovery comes
only when Socrates divides the comprehensive kind μανία into differentiated kinds.
Because simple collection leaves such distinctions obscure, NM, so far as it relies on
(i), is impotent to distinguish the various connotations of a term. Plato also comes to
reconsider assumption (ii) when he argues in the Statesman that it is characteristic
of improper division to assume that every general term uniformly corresponds to a
natural kind unified by a single Form. The Stranger illustrates the impact of this
illicit assumption with the word ‘barbarian’ (βάρβαρος):
[I mean] this sort of thing: if for instance someone who endeavored to
divide humankind (τἀνθρώπινον [...] γένος) divided it in two just as most
people here apportion things, separating the Greeks as one, distinct from
all the rest, and the other races all together, which are unlimited, and
which do not mix or speak the same language as one another, calling
them by one name, ‘barbarian’. Because of this single name they also
suppose it to be a single kind (γένος). (Plt. 262c–d)
Unlike the general term ‘bed’, the class of particulars denoted by the term ‘barbar-
ian’ is not unified in virtue of a single form typified in an abstract Barbarian. There
is no abstract Barbarian, only a collection of non-Greek peoples who are collectively
referred to as ‘barbarian’. In other words, ‘barbarian’ designates a class of disparate
kinds who on Plato’s account are severally unified by a single form (i.e., Lydian,
Phrygian), but lack a common principle of unity. Therefore, ‘barbarian’ does not
designate a natural kind as the term ‘Greek’ does.15 Consequently, there is not a
uniform one-to-one correspondence between general terms and abstract Forms, for
15See Moravcsik 1973, 330.
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some such terms completely lack a corresponding Form.16 And given the assump-
tions governing NM, there is no assurance that by positing a single Form for every
collection of objects denoted by a general term one reliably identifies a naturally
unified kind.
NM ultimately fails because it places too much stock in the idea that general
terms pick out natural kinds. As the Stranger advises, “should you persist in not
paying serious attention to names, you will appear wealthier in wisdom into old age”
(261e). In seeking definitions it is better to heed natural distinctions between kinds,
rather than conventional distinctions embodied in the words we use. In fact, there
are distinctions between natural kinds for which we lack a term, and in such cases
it is easier to appeal to the account of a natural kind rather than burdening oneself
with naming it (265c). If the account sufficiently separates the kind from the other
parts of the collection, one is licensed to “impress a single form (ἰδέαν) on it,” that
is, to treat it as a naturally unified kind (258c).
These considerations lead Plato to rejectNM in favor of a procedure for definition
that is more sensitive to the disparity between naturally unified kinds and the classes
of objects denoted by general terms. But even in adopting the Division method of
definition, Plato maintains that there is an intimate relationship between natural
kinds and Forms. A natural kind is unified in virtue of the fact that its members
share a common nature that is typified in an abstract Form. Although Plato comes to
doubt whether our terminology is apt for picking out natural kinds, he is committed
the notion that, where there is a kind that possesses a natural unity, there is a
corresponding Form in virtue of which it is unified. For, insofar as any term or
definite description ‘t ’ indicates a natural kind, it indicates Form T that typifies the
16Moreover, some Forms lack a corresponding term. It often happens in the course of divisions
that the kind one distinguishes lacks a name. See Plt. 261d–e, for instance.
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common form or nature uniting the individual members of the class. This, for Plato
is what a natural kind is—a class of individuals that share a common form typified
in a abstract Form. To this extent, therefore, Plato takes ‘t ’ to indicate both the set
of t-objects and the abstract eidetic T.17
This point will be important for resolving difficulties raised by the intensional and
extensional models of MD, but presently it raises difficulties for Plato’s notion of
definition. If, as we have suggested, Plato understands the definiens of an adequate
defining account of a natural kind to consist in an enumeration of the superordinate
kinds that connect it to the broadest kind it is a part of, and if each of these kinds (so
far as they are natural kinds) comprise both a naturally unified class of particulars
and a Form that typifies their common nature, then he is committed to an account of
definition that entails positing relationships among the Forms. Accordingly, MD is
premised on an account of the interaction between Forms that Plato develops in the
17Extra support for this claim may be found in the ‘Divine Method’ of the Philebus. According
to this account, “whatever is said to be consists of one and many, having in its nature limit and
unlimitedness. Since this is the structure of things, we have to assume that there is in each case
always one form (μίαν ἰδέαν) for every one of them, and we must search for it, as we will indeed find
it there. And once we have grasped it, we must look for two, as the case would have it, or if not, for
three or some other number. And we must treat every one of those further unities in the same way,
until it is not only established of the original unity that it is one, many and unlimited (ἄπειρα), but
also how many kinds it is (ὁπόσα)” (16d; tr. D. Frede). Here, Plato appears to be making explicit
the two-aspects of every natural kind: the unity of the kind corresponding to a common form as
well as the plurality of disparate particulars subsumed under it. Just like MD, the Divine Method
proceeds by establishing various kinds subsumed under it until it establishes a finite plurality of
kinds.
As Hampton notes, on this reading “the Divine Method reinforces the idea that a monad or Form
must be a mind-independent entity of a high ontological order; it is one (and, assuming it has parts,
a definite number or many) over its indefinite sensible instances. The Divine Method suggests that
the Forms exist in that they order the sensible world and thus make it intelligible” (1990, 35). It is
in virtue of grasping the form of the one that one comes to comprehend the nature of the plurality
subsumed under it.
This reading, however, may be problematic, for it requires that the ἄπειρα referred to in this
passage must be understood as sensible particulars, the disparate objects that populate the class
typified by the single form. However, only a few lines below in the text, Plato uses the same term
to refer to the class of the unlimited, which includes every quality susceptible to the more and the
less, like hot and cold (24a–25a). Thus, the present reading has difficulty accommodating the use
of ἄπειρα in both passages. Fortunately, the interpretation of MD developed here does not depend
on the evidence of Philebus 16, so we may leave this matter for another discussion.
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Sophist. Upon turning to this account in the next section, we will see that, because on
Plato’s view true statements make predications that correspond to real connections
among the Forms, MD, as a method for formulating definitions, is supposed to map
relations between the Forms in virtue of which a definition is true and meaningful.
2.3 Platonic definition
For Plato, an adequate defining account of a natural kind is a statement that enu-
merates a chain of related kinds connecting it to a comprehensive kind of which it
is a part. MD functions as a means of formulating definitions by discovering the
relations that obtain between a superordinate kind and the indivisible kind that lies
at the terminus of the division. This relation generally is mediated by a number of
intermediate kinds (differentiae) that are divisible yet possess a natural unity that
allow them to constitute a subkind of the superordinate kind. This notion of defini-
tion naturally entails a rich theory of the relations that obtain between kinds, and
Plato attempts to furnish such a theory in the Sophist.
The Stranger’s first six divisions of the sophist are inadequate because they fail
to generate agreement on the precise nature of the sophist’s expertise, the specific
feature that unites the class of individuals properly called ‘sophist’ (Sph. 232a). The
seventh (and successful) division—the division that locates the sophistic expertise
as a sub-kind of the appearance-making part of the human kind of the productive
part of expertise—leads the Stranger and Theaetetus to consider the possibility of
false belief and speech, which invites the question “To what should this name, ‘that
which is not’ (τὸ μὴ ὄν), be applied” (237c)? Put otherwise, the question asks in
what sense the kind indicated by ‘that which is not’ is a part of the kind indicated
by ‘that which is’. The ensuing account of the ability of the kinds to commingle
(συμμείγνυσθαι) distinguishes different types of relations between kinds.
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It cannot be the case that none of the kinds commingle, for “on this agreement
everything quickly becomes upset” (252a). Any statement that predicates one kind
of another is bound to apply the kind being (e.g., ‘angling is a part of expertise’).
Minimally, some kinds must associate with being, namely those that are said to be.18
Hence there must be relations among the Forms. Yet it cannot be the case that all
of the kinds commingle with each other, for “if motion and rest belonged to each
other, then change would be completely at rest and conversely rest itself would be
changing” (252d).19 But motion and rest are contrary kinds (250a); something is
at rest only if it is not in motion and vice versa. Since not all kinds are capable of
commingling, but some kinds are capable of sharing in many other kinds, there must
be different types of relations that obtain between kinds.20
In a very difficult passage, Plato limns four types of relation between kinds:
Then someone who is able to do this would adequately discern [iii] a single
form (μίαν ἰδέαν) extended in every way through many, each one standing
separately, as well as [iv] many [forms] different from each other encom-
passed by a single [form] outside them, and again [v] one joined together
through many wholes, and [vi] many that are completely separate. This,
the ability [to know] in what way each associates and in what way each
does not, is to know how to distinguish (διακρίνειν) according to classes
(κατὰ γένη). (253d–e)
The last line of the passage suggests that comprehending the range of possible re-
lations between forms constitutes the ability to divide according to classes. More-
18Cf. 254d: “But that which is is blended with both, for both in some way are.”
19Tr. White. Interestingly, Plato adds the counterfactual claim that “if motion in some way had
a share in rest, it would not be strange to call it resting” (256b). That is, if change and rest were
sufficiently to commingle there would be truth to the statement ‘(some) change is resting’, though
in reality the two kinds have no share of one another, so one cannot truly be predicated of the
other. On the ambiguity of the predication relation in the Sophist, see Vlastos 1973.
20Plato summarizes as follows the range of possible relations obtaining among kinds: “So we
have agreed that some of the classes (τω˜ν γενω˜ν) are disposed to associate (κοινωνε˜ιν) with each
other and some are not, some only with a few and others with many, and nothing prevents some
communicating with every one, passing through everything” (254b–c). Note that in the next line
Plato moves from talking about γένη to talking about εἴδη, without any discernable change in topic.
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over, relations (iii)–(vi) are promising models for the relations among kinds revealed
through division.21 But there is better evidence for this claim just a few lines above.
The Stranger draws an analogy between relations among kinds or forms and rela-
tions among letters of the alphabet: “Since some [kinds] are disposed to do this [sc.,
commingle] and some are not, they are almost like letters, for some of them are not
suited for each other, but some fit together well” (252e–253a). And just as it takes an
expert in grammar to identify the determinate combinations among letters, it takes
an expert in dialectic to discern relations among kinds:
Won’t we say that it is of the dialectical expertise (τη˜ς διαλεκτικη˜ς [...]
ἐπιστήμης) to divide according to classes (κατὰ γένη) and not to suppose
that the same kind (εἶδος) is another or that a different kind is the same?
(253d)
As in the Phaedrus, the expert in dialectic is characterized by the ability to divide
κατὰ τινα,22 but while the dialectician is characterized in the Phaedrus as being able
to divide “according to kinds (κατ’ εἴδη),” the account of the dialectician here notes
the ability to divide according to classes (γένη). We are not getting a different
account of the dialectician, however, but rather a different side of the same account.
It has often been noted that, in the Sophist at least, Plato uses γένος and εἶδος
interchangeably,23 and it is true that Plato often seems to substitute one for the other
21It is tempting to suppose that there is a neat fit between the relations outlined in this passage
and those discovered through MD. The relationship between a comprehensive kind and one sub-
sumed under it, for instance, seems aptly characterized by (iii) or (iv)—perhaps an instance of (iii)
would be the relationship obtaining between the kinds being, change, and rest (250a–c), and of (iv)
the relationship obtaining between the kind expertise and the subkinds productive expertise and
acquisitive expertise (219). But what about (vi)? How can a kind that stands totally separate from
the other forms be reached through division? This consideration should invite doubt whether Plato
is actually enumerating the relations that MD reveals, but it should not discourage the project
as a whole. That there are some kinds which cannot be accounted for by means of MD does not
entail that MD does not adequately distinguish between kinds. The last line of the passage states
to the contrary that recognizing that (iii)–(vi) are all possible relations between kinds is a feature
of someone who possesses the expertise necessary for MD, the ability to distinguish natural kinds.
22See Phaedrus 265d–266d, outlined in § 2.1 above.
23See e.g., Vlastos 1973, 271n3 and Cohen 1973, 187.
22
without any change in topic or context—notable examples include 222d, 227d–228e,
253d, and especially 254b. But given the disparity between the common connotation
of ‘γένος’ (‘clan’, ‘family’, and, more generally, ‘collection’ or ‘class’) and ‘εἶδος’
(‘shape’, ‘figure’, ‘nature’), there must be an independent reason why Plato can
use these words interchangeably. Recall from the last section that there are two
aspects to a natural kind. Plato takes a natural kind to comprise both a class
of particulars that share some common nature and an abstract Form that typifies
that common nature. For this reason, I suggest that ‘εἶδος’ and ‘γένος’ are used
interchangeably in the Sophist because Plato is concerned exclusively with natural
kinds. The former term designates a natural kind while emphasizing its formal unity,
whereas the latter term designates a natural kind while emphasizing the plurality of
disparate particulars subsumed under it. The interchangeability of these terms for
Plato’s purposes indicates that the dialectician, and henceMD, is focused on natural
kinds. For it is according to the distinctions among these that division proceeds and
only relations among these that entail associations between the Forms.
Accordingly, Plato claims that association among the forms is what makes speech
meaningful: “Separating each thing from every other thing is the complete destruc-
tion of all statements (πάντων λόγων), for speech came about for us in virtue of
the combination of the kinds with each other (τὴν ἀλλήλων τω˜ν εἰδω˜ν συμπλοκὴν)”
(259e).24 Meaningful statements consist in the successful weaving together of names
and verbs that fit together (262d–e), but this does not of itself guarantee a true
statement. A statement is true when it “says things that are, as they are,” but false
24For more evidence of Plato’s commitment to the intimate connection between meaningful speech
and the Forms, see Parmenides 135b–c: “If someone, having an eye on all the difficulties we have
just brought up and others of the same sort, won’t allow that there are forms for things and won’t
mark off a form (εἶδος) for each one, he won’t have anywhere to turn his thought, since he doesn’t
allow that for each thing there is a character (ἰδέαν) that is always the same. In this way he will
destroy the power of dialectic entirely” (tr. Gill and Ryan).
23
when it says things “other than the things that are” (263b). In short, a true state-
ment will make, and a false statement will fail to make, a true predication about
its subject. Such predications minimally invoke connections between Being itself
and other Forms, so a true predication will correspond to an actual relation among
Forms. Thus, so far as MD formulates definitions for natural kinds, it will track
actual relations between Forms. The chain of connections between a natural kind
and a more comprehensive kind of which it is a part entails a chain of connections
between Forms in virtue of which those relations are meaningful.25
Consequently MD, in discovering relations among natural kinds, maps actual
connections among their corresponding Forms. This is why Division must proceed
along natural kinds or classes. For if it did not, the connections established in
the differentiation of kinds would not correspond to connections between Forms,
and the resulting definition would not make a true predication. It is therefore of
paramount importance that the dialectician divide according to natural kinds—kinds
corresponding to Forms. To make the procedure reliable, Plato will need to establish
rules for making proper “cuts,” that is, for differentiating parts of a divided kind that
correspond to natural kinds. As we turn to the mechanics of MD, it will become
apparent that this is Plato’s central aim in establishing rules for proper division.
2.4 The mechanics of division
If MD is to meet its objective of formulating the defining account of a given kind, the
weaving-together of the kinds linking the definiendum to the broadest kind of which it
25See Moravcsik 1973, 326: “The method not only answers the question, What are definitions
about? but also the question, What configurations make a definition true or adequate? At the
same time, in so far as we find Forms as parts of several other Forms, or as an entity that can have
other Forms as parts, the uniqueness of each Form can be expressed by locating it on a conceptual
map that traces the interrelationships. [...] In short, what underlies the successful divisions and
collections must yield unique characterizations of any given Form.”
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is said to be a part must make a true predication corresponding to relations actually
obtaining between Forms. To do this, Plato argues that Division must divide natural
kinds, for only these have a Form as a principle of unity. Failing to heed distinctions
among natural kinds yields a division that does not correspond to relations among
Forms, and the resulting definition consequently fails to make a true predication.
Plato recognizes the pitfalls attending haphazard collecting and dividing, and in the
Statesman he takes steps to identify and eliminate illicit applications of MD:
Because they [sc. “many of the sophisticates”] are not accustomed to con-
ducting inquiries by dividing according to natural kinds, they straight-
away [vii] group together differing sorts of things into the same [col-
lection], thinking them to be alike, and furthermore they [viii] do the
opposite of this by dividing other things not according to parts (οὐ κατὰ
μέρη). (Plt. 285a)
By (vii), in Collection one should avoid classifying things that are seemingly alike
but are in reality different, and by (viii), in Division one should not neglect the
real “parts” of the kind being divided. Plato goes on to describe features of proper
collections and divisions:
It is necessary, when someone perceives first the fellowship between many
things, not to desist before one [ix] sees all the differentiae (διαφορὰς) in
it established in as many kinds (εἴδεσι); and likewise, when the various
unlikenesses are seen in large number, one must [x] be incapable of looking
askance and ceasing before surrounding them in some real class (γένους
τινὸς οὐσίᾳ) by enclosing all of the related things within one likeness
(ὁμοιότητος). (285a–b)
By (ix), proper Division consists in identifying all of the διαφοραί that separate
natural kinds. Likewise, according to (x), proper Collection consists in classifying
disparate kinds (“unlikenesses”) according to real classes by subsuming related kinds
under a single likeness. While this account of MD agrees with the model developed
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from the Phaedrus account in section 2.1, it does not offer much help in distinguish-
ing proper from illicit applications of the method. The difference between collections
described in (vii) and (x) lies in whether one collects kinds that can be subsumed
under a genuine class. But how does one discern whether the collection is a genuine
class, rather a loose grouping of unrelated particulars? Proper divisions as charac-
terized by (ix) differ from those characterized by (viii) in that one discerns only the
differentiae separating natural kinds and divides according to parts. But how does
one know whether the resulting parts correspond to natural kinds, or whether the
selected differentiae are those distinguishing natural kinds? Moreover, what is the
relationship between a natural kind (εἶδος) and a part (μέρος)?
To answer the problems related to Division, Plato stipulates conditions on which
a chain of divisions would reliably distinguish natural kinds such that, for each
relationship posited between kinds, there is a corresponding ontological relationship
between the relevant Forms. These conditions are cashed out as three guidelines for
making proper “cuts” in Division. Let us examine each of these rules in turn.
(1) Cut through the middle. The Stranger urges us not to divide off only “one small
part, leaving behind many large [parts], and not with respect to kinds” (262b). To
guard against this mistake, one must be wary of making thin cuts: “When cutting it is
safer to go through the middle, so that one will encounter more forms (ἰδέαις)” (Ibid.).
Plato’s worry is that, in establishing the differentiae of the divided kind, one separates
only one real class (and hence, natural kind), leaving behind a heterogeneous and
ununified collection. An instance of such a mistake is the division of humankind
into ‘Greek’ and ‘barbarian’. Though the word ‘Greek’ may pick out a natural
kind of human being, the division also posits a class of non-Greeks or barbarians,
which for Plato is not a natural kind. Cases like this can result if one picks out too
few differentiae—as in the case of ‘Greek’ and ‘barbarian’—but also if one tries to
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divide too quickly and skips an intermediate kind linking a subordinate kind to a
more comprehensive one.26 If one tries to make even cuts (i.e., cutting “through the
middle” of the divided kind), the differentiae are more likely to distinguish classes
whose members have a real likeness typified in an abstract Form. Of course, this
rule presupposes that a dichotomous division of the divided kind is possible; if the
divided kind does not split neatly into two subordinate kinds, then dividing through
the middle will not discover differentiae of parts corresponding to natural kinds.
(2) Make as few cuts as possible. Almost all of the divisions of the Sophist and
Statesman are dichotomous. However, Plato does recognize that sometimes dichoto-
mous division is not possible. When the Stranger reaches the kind corresponding to
care of human herds in his division of the statesman from the superordinate kind
called ‘knowledge’, he is forced to make a polytomous division: “So then let us divide
them [sc., contributory causes] limb by limb, just like a sacrificial animal, since we
are unable to divide them into two; for one must always cut into the nearest number
that one can” (287c). As in guideline (1), Plato is trying to avoid positing differentiae
that fail to distinguish real classes. But this time, he wants to avoid positing too
many differentiae. Just as too few differentiae makes one liable to dividing into parts
too broad to correspond to a natural kind, too many differentiae makes one liable
to fragmenting kinds and making arbitrary distinctions. Therefore, if dichotomous
division (by definition the smallest number of cuts one can make) is impossible, one
should try to make as few cuts as one can to differentiate the divided kind into parts
corresponding to natural kinds.
(3) Divide into classes of successive generality. Though one should be careful
not to make more or fewer cuts than necessary, it is also necessary to avoid making
a division into a part of such a generality before that level of generality has been
26E.g., Young Socrates’ division of herd rearing into that of humans and that of animals (262a).
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reached:
The division would be done better, more by natural kinds and more into
two, if one cut number by means of even and odd, and the human race
in its turn by means of male and female, and only split off Lydians or
Phrygians or anyone else and ranged them against all the rest when one
was at a loss as to how to split in such a way that each of the halves split
off was simultaneously a class and part. (262e–263a; tr. White, with
modifications)
Division proceeds according to parts, and it is essential to the part-whole relationship
that the part be less comprehensive than the whole of which it is a part. In the class
corresponding to humankind, the classes of males and females are much broader than
the classes of Lydians and Phrygians, so the former cannot be parts of the latter.
If one were to divide humankind first into Greek, Lydian, Phrygians, and so forth,
each would be subject to further division into male and female. Because these latter
kinds are more general than the former, they do not fall under a single kind, but
are spread across all of them. Consequently, this division is illicit because it is not
correct to say ‘Female is a part of Lydian (or Greek, Phrygian, et cetera)’, so it has
failed to generate an adequate chain of connections between a indivisible kind and
the most generic kind of which it is a part.27 Making successively smaller divisions
is supposed to solve this problem by keeping the part-whole relation, on which the
whole process of Division depends, intact. As Plato puts it, it is only when one
cannot find a way to split the divided kind into broad natural kinds that one should
look for more precise distinctions.
The motivation for each of these rules is summarized in a pithy maxim uttered by
the Stranger: “Let the part at the same time contain a kind” (262b). It is possible to
divide in many different ways, each way yielding different parts of the same whole.
27Of course, it is also false to say ‘Lydian is a part of female’, for instance, because it is just
as correct to say ‘Lydian is a part of Greek’, so it is unclear exactly what ontological relation this
division reveals. Unfortunately, this problem is not taken up by Plato.
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But the Stranger warns that the various parts into which a whole may be divided
do not necessarily correspond to natural kinds: “Whenever there is a natural kind of
something, it is necessarily also a part of whatever thing of which it is said to be a
kind; but there is no necessity that a part be a natural kind” (263b). The defining
characteristic of proper Division is that the parts divided consist in natural kinds.
Thus, it is only proper divisions that discover the ontological configurations in virtue
of which definitions make true predications.
It will be noticed, however, that Plato’s guidelines for proper Division are not
strictly formal, and so fall short of making this component of MD a decidable pro-
cess.28 In every application of the procedure, where one ought to divide is determined
by specific content of the divided kind. Thus, guideline (1) applies only in cases in
which the divided kind divides neatly into two subkinds, but it is of no help where
proper dichotomous division is not possible. Guideline (2) seems more generally ap-
plicable, but it is not helpful in deciding how many cuts to make; Plato only advises
that the fewer cuts one makes, the more reliable the division is likely to be. Of
these three guidelines, (3) is perhaps the most helpful. The part-whole relationship
exploited by Division requires, of course, that the whole be more comprehensive than
its parts. By requiring divisions of successive generality, Plato ensures that the part-
whole relationship stays intact. Though necessary for proper Division, (3) of itself
is not sufficient for proper application of the method. Rather, it only maintains the
integrity of the divisions on the assumption that it proceeds according to natural
kinds. Ultimately, then, these three guidelines are neither independently necessary,
28On this point I agree with Moravcsik. See his 1973, 344: “It is crucial for the understanding of
the Method of Division that Plato gives no mechanical procedure for finding natural kinds. Plato
does not think that there are any such procedures. He is not giving a discovery procedure, he is
explicating the ontological configurations that obtain once we have discovered natural kinds. [...]
The discovery of such kinds is as much the work of creative intellectual intuition as the discovery
of the truths of mathematics.”
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with the notable exception of (3), nor jointly sufficient for proper Division. This
conclusion has motivated some scholars to claim that Platonic division is a funda-
mentally intuitive procedure,29 and Plato himself seems to concede the inadequacy of
his guidelines: “In the present circumstances, I have to say, it is impossible to show
what I mean with absolute completeness; but I must bring it just a little further
forward for the sake of clarity” (262c). Though they fall far short of genuine rules
for discerning natural kinds, Plato’s guidelines for proper Division are meant to be
helpful guides for dividing in such a way that one is more likely to separate distinct
natural kinds.
Unfortunately, Plato does not offer similar guidelines for Collection. To ensure
proper Collection one must be careful to group things according to one real, and
not merely apparent, likeness or common form, but there is no rule of thumb for
distinguishing a real from an apparent likeness. Thus, the initial step of MD, in
which a comprehensive kind is predicated of the definiendum, requires the assumption
that the definiendum is part of the comprehensive kind, that is, that it shares in the
common form unifying the broad kind of which it is said to be a part. Accordingly,
Platonic divisions begin with an assumption or θέσις, namely that the definiendum
belongs as part to a more comprehensive kind.30 Not only that, but this sort of
assumption is required at every step of the division. After dividing the calculative
part of theoretical knowledge into directive and judgement-making, the Stranger asks
“into which of these sorts of expertise should we posit (θετέον) the kingly expertise”
(Plt. 260c; cf. also 259d)? In general, for each step of the division, it is necessary to
29E.g., Balme 1987, 70 f.; see also note 28 above.
30So begins, e.g., the division of the angler: “So tell me: shall we posit (θήσομεν) him to be an
expert or some sort of non-expert, but having another ability? (Sph. 219a); and the division of
the statesman: “So tell me: should we posit (θετέον) this as someone who has knowledge too, or
what?” (Plt. 258b). Cf. also the beginning of the division of the sophist (Sph. 221d).
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make an assumption that the definiendum is a part of only one of the divided kinds.31
Consequently, the division as a whole can only be as strong as the assumptions on
which it depends. If any one of these assumptions fails, the whole division fails to map
onto the ontological connections in virtue of which the definiendum is connected to
the comprehensive kind of which it is a part, and the resulting definition consequently
fails. A division, it seems, is only as strong as its weakest assumption.
On this understanding of the component operations of MD, we may elaborate on
the model developed in section 2.1: for any set of indivisible kinds K = {k1, . . . , kn}
collected under a superordinate divisible kind F, Collection posits some indivisible
definiendum ki ∈ K as an F -kind as a preliminary account of ki. Division identifies
differentiae corresponding to divisible natural kinds within F, F 1 . . . Fn, and for each
stage of Division an assumption is made that ki is a subkind of some differentia F m.
The operation proceeds by dividing differentiae into classes of successively less gen-
erality and positing the definiendum as a subkind of one of the differentiae until one
reaches the definiendum itself. The complete definiens consists in a recapitulation of
the steps of the division from the most general superordinate kind to the immedi-
ate differentia that separates the definiendum from the closest neighboring kind(s).
If MD is performed successfully, each posited part-whole relation between natural
31Cavini (1995) refers to the whole of these assumptions as the “thetic step” of Platonic divi-
sion: “[I]n Plato’s Sophist and Statesman one disjunct [of the disjunction of parts of the divided
class] is always ‘assumed’ (with the systematic occurrence of the verb τίθημι in this sense) and the
other (implicitly or explicitly) ‘taken away’...” (125). I agree with this much of Cavini’s analysis.
However, I disagree with his contention that “a diaeretic (chain) argument is also a chain of eidetic
disjunctions and divisions [i.e., the statement that the definiendum is a part of one or the other
of the differentiated kinds of the superordinate divided kind] linked up by a thetic step of class
inclusion (‘Every statesman has a cognitive competence’) or class membership (‘Statesmanship is
a cognitive competence’)” (127, my emphasis). Platonic division proceeds exclusively according to
kinds, which consist in a class of particulars (or, in the case of divisible kinds, subordinate kinds)
and a corresponding Form typifying the form shared by the members of the class. Therefore, on my
view the thetic step is always an assumption of class inclusion. See, for instance, Plt. 259d: “Then
shall we combine (συνθήσομεν) all these, the statesman’s expertise and the statesman, as well as
the kingly expertise and the king, into the same [kind]?”
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kinds stipulated by the division corresponds to an ontological relationship between
the relevant Forms. If MD successfully maps the ontological relations obtaining
between the relevant Forms at each step of the division, the resulting account will
make a true predication of the definiendum. In this consists the defining account of
the definiendum ki.
2.5 What do divisions show?
The proper object of Platonic division is a natural kind. Natural kinds have a
special place in Plato’s ontology because each one consists in class of particulars that
share in a form typified by an abstract Form. In virtue of this connection between
class and Form, a natural kind is subject to definition, a meaningful statement that
predicates relationships between the defined kind and more comprehensive natural
kinds of which it is a part. These logical relationships between natural kinds indicate
ontological connections among the Forms typifying the relevant natural kinds, and
the definition formulated through division is true in virtue of corresponding to these
ontological connections. A successful application of MD, therefore, will accurately
trace the relations that make a statement about the defined kind true.
In light of the preceding discussion, what can be said about the problem with
which we began? We saw that, if MD is construed as a procedure for dividing inten-
sional entities like Forms, it must be accompanied by a novel understanding of the
part-whole relationship on which the procedure depends. But if MD is construed as a
procedure for dividing extensions of Forms, and so depends on set-theoretic relation-
ships like class inclusion, then Plato seems committed to the claim that coextensive
Forms are identical. But if, as on the view developed here, MD is understood as
a procedure for dividing natural kinds, we are committed neither to the identity of
coextensive Forms nor (fully) to a counterintuitive understanding of the part-whole
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relationship. For on this view, coextensive Forms would not be identical, because
they are intensionally distinct. That is to say, Wisdom and Justice, though perhaps
coextensive, typify distinct properties or intensions, so the class of particulars whose
members all possess these properties belong to two distinct natural kinds, each hav-
ing a distinct Form.32 Moreover, this view allows an intuitive understanding of the
part-whole relation that is fully explicable in terms of class inclusion. Any natural
kind is a part of a superordinate, divisible kind just in case it constitutes a subclass
of the superordinate kind. The unique nature of natural kinds entails that their
interrelations correspond to interrelations among the Forms. This is why the focus
of Plato’s guidelines for division is on reliably identifying natural kinds; any collec-
tion can be a part of a superordinate kind, but only the part-whole relations among
natural kinds indicate relations among the Forms. That relationships between in-
tensional entities like Forms are not easily explicated should not pose a problem for
this model, for as long as the connections established through divisions are between
kinds that consist in a Form and a class of particulars that share its likeness, there
is good reason on Plato’s ontology to expect that the relations of the latter aspect
of the kind correspond to relations of the former.
32This analysis holds of the account of the virtues given in Republic IV, but it evidently does not
hold of the Protagoras account (see note 8 above), for if the account of natural kinds presented in
this section is correct, then the Protagoras and Republic IV give inconsistent accounts of virtue.
On the Republic IV account, Justice, Wisdom, Temperance, and Courage are all subsumed under
the single Form Virtue, yet they admit of different definitions so far as they correspond to different
parts of the soul. On this account Virtue would be a divisible kind, and so could be differentiated
into parts corresponding to the four virtues. In the Protagoras, however, Plato refutes the thesis
that these are distinct parts of virtue. On the view of natural kinds presented there, Plato, in
maintaining the homogeneity of the parts of virtue, is arguing in effect that virtue is an indivisible
kind. Because there are not differences inherent in virtue adequate to constitute a subkind of virtue,
Justice, Courage, Temperance, Piety, and Wisdom collapse into the same account. Hence, Plato is
tempted to conclude that these terms are nothing more than “five names for one thing,” namely,
virtue (349b). The difference between the Republic IV and Protagoras accounts of virtue consists
in part in Plato’s treatment of the natural kind termed ‘virtue’. In the former dialogue this kind is
divisible into four subkinds, but in the latter it is treated as indivisible, such that any division of
the kind is bound to be arbitrary.
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3. ARISTOTLE ON DIVISION I
On Plato’s view, the Method of Division (MD) owes its eminence in philosophi-
cal inquiry to its capacity to illuminate the nature of the Forms. To be sure, for
Plato knowledge of the Forms constitutes the highest form of knowledge.33 For in
studying the relationships among the Forms one thereby reveals the connections that
make statements true and meaningful. By exploiting the unique nature of natural
kinds—that they comprise a class whose members share a common form typified in
an abstract Form—MD establishes logical part-whole relations among kinds that
map onto ontological relations obtaining among the Forms. Paying heed to these on-
tological relations enables the dialectician to formulate complete and true definitions
that correspond to real connections in nature.
When Aristotle, likely in his Academic period (circa 367-347 b.c.e.), takes up
the topic of relations among kinds, he makes a number of important distinctions that
allow him to formalize the relations between divisible and indivisible kinds. On his
view, however, division is but a “small part” of his analytic system of deduction, the
cornerstone of his theory of scientific demonstration (An. Pr. I.31, 46a31). Because
he maintains that proper demonstration is a deduction from necessary premises, he
argues thatMD fails to meet the demands of scientific inquiry. In the Analytics and
Parts of Animals, Aristotle presents a host of objections to division, criticizing it for
lacking deductive necessity and assuming the definitions it sets out to demonstrate.
Most importantly, he faults division for failing to account for the unity required of
33See Deslauriers (1990), esp. § V.
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definitions. But, perhaps curiously, Aristotle also takes steps to correct the flaws he
identifies inMD and offers criteria on which division might be useful for formulating
definitions. He suggests that, if these criteria are met, then in fact division will
possess a sort of deductive necessity.
The task of this section is to outline Aristotle’s reception of Platonic division.
It will be argued that Aristotle’s views on MD are motivated by two distinct, if
not completely independent, considerations. One motivation is logical in nature.
Aristotle’s conception of demonstration depends in large part on the claim that
definitions, as the starting points of deduction, are themselves indemonstrable. To
the extent that it purports to demonstrate definitions, MD is inconsistent with
Aristotle’s picture of scientific inquiry. The other motivation is metaphysical in
nature. Underpinning Aristotle’s account of definition is an ontology of discrete
substances. Because the unity of substance is paramount in this ontology, Aristotle
requires that a definition, which is supposed to give an account of the essence of
a substance, constitute a unity. On the basis of this commitment to the unity of
substance, he criticizes MD for failing to account for the unity of definition. The
discussion of this section will detail those of Aristotle’s criticisms that stem from the
former consideration, but in large part will leave those stemming from the second
consideration unanalyzed. These will be taken up in the final section.
This discussion will proceed as follows: first, we will examine the innovations
in formalizing relationships among natural kinds34 Aristotle develops in the Topics;
second, we will examine Aristotle’s critique of division in the Prior Analytics in
comparison with his own analytic method of deduction; third, we will examine how
these criticisms are applied to his theory of scientific demonstration in the Posterior
34In remaining two sections, except where otherwise indicated, I will be using ‘kind’ and ‘natural
kind’ interchangeably.
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Analytics; and finally, we will examine Aristotle’s modifications of MD and outline
his criteria for proper division. These criteria depend on his analysis of kinds into
species and genera, which are explained in detail in the Topics. It is therefore to this
text that we must first draw our attention.
3.1 Species and genera
It was suggested (§ 2.3) that, in the dialogues under consideration, and most no-
tably in the Sophist, Plato uses ‘εἶδος’ and ‘γένος’ interchangeably when speaking
of natural kinds. He uses the former generally to stress the specific nature shared
by the members of a natural kind and typified in its corresponding Form, and the
latter to stress the community of members unified under the kind. It was noted also
that, so far as some natural kinds have other kinds as parts and some do not, Plato
maintains a distinction between divisible and indivisible kinds. When Aristotle takes
up the issue of relations among kinds in the Topics, ‘εἶδος’ and ‘γένος’ had become
terms of art for the practice of dialectic in the early Academy.35 Instead of employing
these terms interchangeably, he uses ‘γένος’ (‘genus’) to refer exclusively to a broad,
divisible kind, and ‘εἶδος’ (‘species’) to refer exclusively to a narrow, indivisible kind.
Accordingly, his definition of the former term acknowledges its characteristic gen-
erality: “A genus is what is predicated in what a thing is for a plurality of things
differing in their kind (εἴδει)” (102a31–32). A genus, in other words, is a component
35Aristotle in Topics I.2 notes three purposes for which the treatise is useful: “[i] for intellectual
exercise (γυμνασίαν), [ii] conversation, [and iii] the philosophical sciences” (101a27–28). Of particu-
lar interest for the present discussion is (i), for what Aristotle likely means by “intellectual exercise”
is a formalized style of debate that Plato mentions in the Parmenides and many scholars think was
institutionalized in the Academy (see Slomkowski 1997, 11 ff.). If this is correct, it is plausible that
the Topics has origins at a time when Aristotle was affiliated with the Academy. This is important
to our study because, if Aristotle’s analysis of genus-species relations arose from his experience in
dialectical exercise with systematic dividers like Plato, Speusippus, and Xenocrates, this fact makes
it plausible that it should be understood to coincide with his polemics against MD in other works
like the Analytics, a work that might not have origins in Aristotle’s Academic period.
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of the essence of a plurality of kinds, such that it will be included in any account of
the essence of any one of these kinds.36 Thus, genera are distinguished from species
in that they are “predicated” in the essence of many different kinds of thing. It
follows that every genus is predicated in the essence of two or more species (Top.
IV.2, 123a30), each of which is distinguished by ‘differentiae’ (διαφοραί), qualities
of the genus that individuate species according to their special features (Top. IV.6,
128a27). For any genus G and species S1...Sn in which G is predicated, there are at
least n differentiae D qualifying G that individuate the species.37 A species, then, is
the subject of a genus predicate. Though species too are predicated of the individuals
that populate them, those individuals are not different in kind such that there could
be differentiae of the species, but rather are the same qua members of the species.
Aristotle elaborates on the predication relationship in the Categories:
Whenever one thing is predicated of another, as of a subject, everything
that is said of what is predicated will be said of the subject as well.
For instance, human being is predicated of some individual human, and
animal is predicated of human being; therefore animal will be predicated
of the individual human as well, for an individual human is both a human
being and an animal. (Cat. 2, 1b10–15)
On Aristotle’s view, to predicate something of another thing is to attribute to it
the account of what is predicated of it. The statements ‘Socrates is a human’ and
‘Socrates is an animal’ are both true in virtue of the fact that he is the member of the
species human being; because the genus animal is predicated of the species human
being, it is true to say both ‘human beings are animals’ and ‘this human being (e.g.,
Socrates) is an animal’—the former statement, of course, referring to the species,
36See Top. I.9, 103b35–37: “for each of these sorts [of predicate], if it is said of itself or if its
genus is said of it, signifies what it is.”
37Of course, there may be more differentiae, since some will distinguish classes of species, each of
which is individuated by its own specific differentia (see Figure 2 below). These former differentiae
function as subordinate genera of the genus they qualify. Thus, Aristotle sometimes speaks of
genera that fall under the same genus (see e.g., Top. IV.2, 122a3–5 and VI.6, 144b20–30).
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and the latter to a member of the species.
In forging this distinction between genus and species, Aristotle makes explicit
what had remained a tacit premise in Plato’s discussions of kinds: the sort of thing
that stands as the subject term in a definition is different in kind from the sort that
stands as an element of its definiens. As a result of this common premise, Aristotle’s
terminology can be constructed into a formal model for the relation between genus
and species that resembles the model of Platonic division pictured in Figure 1 (§ 2.1),
as Figure 2 illustrates. Moreover, the formal relationship that for Aristotle obtains
G
D1(G1)
S1(D1a) S2(D1b)
D2(G2)
S3(D2a) S4(D2b)
Figure 2: Basic Model of Genus-Species Relations
between a genus and its various species reflects this important distinction. Topics IV
is dedicated to a discussion of genera, and here we find an account of the connection
between genus and species, a relation that Aristotle calls ‘partaking’:
Partaking (μετέχειν38) is defined as the admitting of the account (λόγον)
of what is partaken. It is clear, then, that the species partake of their
genera, but the genera do not partake of their species. (IV.1, 121a11–13)
38Aristotle’s use of this term may provide further evidence for the continuity between his and
Plato’s views on kinds. This word, of course, has a long and complicated history in Platonic
philosophy, but he uses it in particular in the Sophist and Statesman to refer to the interaction
among kinds. For instance, on the association of change with the kinds being and non-being, the
Stranger says, “then clearly change really is both something that is not and something that is,
since it partakes (μετέχει) of that which is” (Sph. 256d); indeed, this verb turns up throughout
the discussion of the interaction of the greatest kinds. For a similar instance in the Statesman, see
260a.
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The statement ‘x μετέχει y ’ is true just in case y admits the account of x, but x does
not admit of the account of y. This relation is analogous to the predication relation
between a subject and a predicate. Just as that which is said of an essential predi-
cate can also be said of its subject, that which describes or accounts for something
partaken is included in the account of what partakes of it. The analogy can be taken
further by recalling Aristotle’s definition of genus as what is predicated of a plurality
of species. Whatever is said of the genus can also be said of its species, so it being the
case that the genus is predicated of its species is sufficient for the species to partake
of it. Partaking and predication, then, are two aspects of the same relation.
With respect to genera and species, partaking, like predication, is a transitive,
asymmetrical relationship that obtains between terms of different orders of generality.
This gives Aristotle a formal account of the genus-species relation that both ensures
uniform connections among kinds and disambiguates the terminology of kinds he
inherits from Plato. A genus G is predicated of a species S, and likewise S partakes
of G, just in case whatever is said of G essentially may also be said of S, so that a
complete account of S will include an account of G.39
For Aristotle, then, the relationship between natural kinds, construed intension-
ally, depends on this notion of predication. It follows from this account also that
there are determinate relations between species, differentiae, and genera construed
extensionally. Since every genus is predicated of more than one species, and since
each species is disjoint with every other species in its genus, a species always has a
narrower denotation than its genus: “The elementary principle in regard to all such
cases is that the genus has a wider denotation than the species and its differentia;
for the differentia too has a narrower denotation than the genus” (121b11–14; tr.
39See IV.2, 122b9–10: “It is necessary that the accounts of its genera be predicated of the species
and the things that partake of the species.”
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Pickard-Cambridge). A species, moreover, must have a smaller denotation than the
differentia it falls under, unless it is the only species falling under the differentia,
in which case they will be coextensive. Hence, returning to Aristotle’s example of a
member of the species human being, a person is both a human and an animal because
she partakes of the species human being, which in turn partakes of the genus animal.
The fact that this person is a human being entails that she is also an animal.40
Aristotle’s analysis of the association of kinds obtains for any set of associated
kinds. Whether a given kind fits in among other kinds as a genus or species is
determined by how its account fits within that of the other relevant kinds; that is,
which accounts it partakes of and which accounts partake of it: if it partakes of
the account of no other kind, but others partake of its account, it is a genus of the
highest order; if it partakes of some and some partake of it, it is a subordinate genus
(differentia); and if it partakes of others but none partake of it, it is a species of
some genus. Following Plato, Aristotle understands these relations to be important
for defining kinds. In Topics VI, where Aristotle discusses definition at some length,
he describes the process of defining in terms not unlike those characteristic of MD:
The definer must put (θέντα) [the definiendum] into the genus and attach
the differentiae, for of the parts in the definition the genus seems to be the
greatest indicator of the substance (οὐσίαν) of the definiendum. (VI.1,
139a28–31)
For both Plato and Aristotle, then, defining begins with an assumption or θέσις,
namely that the definiendum belongs to a certain generic kind or genus. Aristotle
continues that this seems to be the most important step, since the genus is the “great-
est indicator” of what the definiendum is. Evidently, the next step is to discern the
40For Aristotle, individual members of a species partake of their species: “For individuals (ἄτομα)
too partake of their genus and species, as for instance some individual human partakes of both
human being and animal” (Top. IV.1, 121a38–39).
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differentiae of the genus, which allows for finer classifications of the definiendum: “the
genus must separate [the definiendum] from other things, and the differentia from
the things in the genus” (VI.3, 140a27–29). It is the last differentia that uniquely
identifies the species within the genus: “the specific [or, species-making] differen-
tia (εἰδοποιὸς διαφορά41), together with the genus, always make the species” (VI.5,
143b8–9).
If this is the recipe for the definition of a species—genus plus specific differentia—
it follows that there is a unique definition for every species (VI.4, 141a35). But this is
not to deny the importance of the connections bridging the specific differentia and the
highest genus. Aristotle argues that stating the specific or final differentia and highest
genus of a definiendum is an elliptical way of stating all of the relevant relations: “for
each differentia imports (ἐπιφέρει) its appropriate genus, just as terrestrial and biped
import with them animal” (VI.6, 144b16–18; cf. VI.5, 143a19–24).42 This point
will be important for understanding the metaphysical gravity Aristotle attributes to
definitions, but for now let it suffice to say that this argument satisfies the account of
definition Aristotle gives at the beginning of the treatise: “a definition is an account
signifying what a thing is (τὸ τὶ ἦν εἶναι)” (I.1, 101b38).43 For each species there is a
unique essence, and a proper definition ought to account for precisely that essence.
41There is some debate over the integrity of the phrase ‘εἰδοποιὸς διαφορά’. It occurs only twice,
with both instances in this chapter, and in their context they seem pleonastic, especially in light of
143b6–7. Brunschwig cites this consideration among his reasons for excising the phrase in his edi-
tion, but argues further that the phrase is not Aristotelian because it indicates a distinction between
intermediate and “species-making” differentiae. Elsewhere Aristotle does not seem to maintain such
a distinction beyond the claim that it is only the final differentia, along with the genus, that makes
the species. See Brunschwig 2007, ad loc. In any case, Aristotle’s claim is that the final differentia
together with the genus comprise the definition of a species.
42For an illuminating discussion of this passage, see Falcon (1996). I agree with Falcon’s analysis
that “this passage is [...] clear evidence for the claim that every differentia entails its genus or rather
that it is logically dependent on its genus” (377).
43Compare this definition to what the Stranger says he seeks in hunting down the sophist: “With
me I think you need to begin the investigation from the sophist—by searching for him and giving
a clear account of what he is (ἐμφανίζοντι λόγῳ τί ποτ’ ἔστι)” (218b-c; tr. White).
41
Clearly, Aristotle thinks definition depends on relations between genera and
species. But does he see a role for MD in formulating definitions? Though he
notes in Topics VI.6 that divisions are helpful in identifying the differentiae of a
genus (143a34–b6), he does not go so far as to claim thatMD is a reliable procedure
for arriving at a definition. We will see in the following sections that Aristotle’s atti-
tude towards division is very complicated. He will advocate a version of the Method
of Division for discovering definitions, but he will also criticize practitioners of MD
for misjudging its virtues and failing to recognize its failures. To examine Aristo-
tle’s reception of MD more closely, we must turn next to Aristotle’s own theory of
demonstration, which he takes great pains to distinguish and champion over what
he sees as its greatest rival, the division method of demonstration.
3.2 ‘A weak syllogism’: An. Pr. I.31
In Prior Analytics I.31 Aristotle says of “division by means of kinds (διὰ τω˜ν γενω˜ν)”
that it is only “a small part of the procedure that has just been described” (46a31–
32; tr. Smith). The procedure he has just described is a method of demonstration
premised on his own formal syllogistic. This method, he suggests, applies to all types
of inquiry, and in each case begins with identifying the principles of the subject in
question:
Thus the route is the same for all things, both for philosophy and for any
sort of art or study. For one must [i] discern the things that belong to
each term and supply as many of them as possible, and [ii] examine them
through the three terms, refuting in this way, and establishing in that.
(I.30, 46a3–7)
Aristotle’s method consists of two components: (i) gathering facts about the terms
proper to the subject of study and (ii) examining the implications of these facts
through formal syllogism. Let us briefly outline each of these components.
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(i) For Aristotle, scientific inquiry begins from previously known facts: “for each
problem one must look to what is previously known about each [of the terms], for
every deduction is through these” (I.29, ; cf. An. Post. I.1, 71a1–2). Thus, the first
task of scientific inquiry is to get the preliminary facts proper to the subject of study.
In light of this body of facts one next generates the terms through which deductions
will be carried out. By grasping what follows from and what implies the terms proper
to a subject of study, one thereby establishes relationships between them. In grasping
these terms and their interrelations, one generates premises from which deductions
can be carried out. The ultimate premises are principles of the subject of study, and
each of these is garnered from experience rather than deduction (I.30, 46a17–18).44
In his commentary on this chapter, Alexander gives an example using the term
‘good’: “for each thing we should make a selection and have prepared things which
are proper to it, [choosing] for example, what things are consequents of good, what
are its antecedents, and what do not hold of it” (in An. Pr. 332, 6–9; tr. Mueller).
Of particular importance to syllogistic deductions are facts about what the term
entails, what entails it, and what does not belong to it (43b1–5). But, of what the
term entails, the only terms that are useful in demonstration are those “predicated in
its essence (ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι)” (I.27, 43b7–8). This, Alexander explains, is because “the
things contained in the defining account of something are predicated in its essence
in the strict sense; and if a thing of which they are predicated were deprived of
their actuality, it would absolutely not exist at all [...] and every definition is in the
essence” (295, 35–296, 2; tr. Mueller). In order to make a demonstration pertaining
to something’s essence, one must deduce from premises about its essence, i.e., from
44See Smith (1989, 158 f.): “These data constitute a ‘collection of facts’ or ‘history’ (historia)
concerning the subject. We then use this summary to draw up the various term-classes with respect
to each term in the science. Application of the procedure to any truth in this historia will then
yield premises from which to deduce it, if they exist.”
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definitions.
(ii) By examining the premises of a given subject “through the three terms,”
Aristotle means that the next step for scientific inquiry is to apply the principles of
the subject to his syllogistic method of deduction. Aristotle’s primary task in the
Prior Analytics is to develop this analytic method of deduction, which is premised
on the claim that every valid deduction is reducible to one of a finite set of valid
logical forms organized into three ‘figures’:45
Every demonstration and every deduction must necessarily come about
through the three figures stated before. With this proved it is clear that
every deduction is both brought to completion through the first figure and
led back into the universal deductions in it. (I.23, 41b1–5; tr. Smith)
Every syllogism consists of a first or ‘major’ term, a middle term, and a last or ‘minor’
term.46 The middle term, he explains, is the term “which both is itself in another
and has another in it,” so that it appears in both of the premises (I.4, 25b35–36; tr.
Smith). The middle term establishes the relationship between the major and minor
terms, so the deduction is ultimately carried out through the middle term. One way
Aristotle distinguishes the three figures is by the relationship the middle term has
to the major and minor terms. Because he maintains that every deduction can be
resolved into a first-figure deduction, it is important for understanding Aristotle’s
criticism of the deductive power of division to observe the relationship that the
middle term ought to have with the major and minor terms in this figure.
Aristotle explains the relationship between the three terms in universal first-figure
deductions as follows:
45The Greek word ἀνάλυσις can be translated as ‘dissolution’ or ‘reduction’. The point that
Aristotle seems to be making in giving this name to his work is that any valid deduction can be
resolved and carried out through one of the three figures he identifies. See Smith (1989, 161).
46In all, Aristotle identifies fourteen valid argument forms for combinations of assertoric state-
ments. For a detailed exposition of Aristotle’s assertoric logic, see Smith (2007), esp. § 5.
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Whenever, then, three terms are so related to each other that the last is
in the middle as a whole and the middle is either in or not in the first
as a whole, it is necessary for there to be a complete deduction of the
extremes. (I.4, 25b32–35; tr. Smith)47
This passage suggests that the relationship between the terms is one of class inclusion,
where the terms denote distinct classes.48 In the first figure, the relationship between
the major and middle terms is that the (class denoted by the) middle term is wholly
included in, or wholly excluded from, the (class denoted by the) major term. The
relationship between the minor and middle terms is that the (class denoted by the)
minor term is wholly included in the middle term. Thus, when the middle term is
wholly included in the major term, then the minor term too will be wholly included
in the major term (Barbara). In this case, the major term will be true of everything
in the minor term. But when the middle term is wholly excluded from the major
term, so too will the minor term (Celarent). In this case, the major term will be true
of nothing in the minor term. When Aristotle claims that every deduction can be
resolved into a universal first-figure deduction, then, we should understand him to
be claiming that every deduction is analyzable in terms of one of these relationships
of class inclusion.
Furthermore, in the last clause of this passage Aristotle alludes to an important
property of syllogistic deductions. Deductions have a unique property in that, if
the premises obtain, the conclusion obtains of necessity. He defines a deduction as
“an account in which, certain things having been supposed, something different from
the things supposed results of necessity because these things are so” (I.1, 24b18–20;
tr. Smith, with modifications). Any argument that can be resolved into a syllogism
47Striker notes (2009, 95) that this sentence “actually describes, not the first figure in general,
but syllogisms in Barbara and Celarent with true premises.” This is well enough, for Aristotle will
argue against the deductive power of division by resolving it into a syllogism in Barbara.
48See Hintikka 2004, 88–89.
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thereby possesses this property of deductive necessity. Given true statements as
premises, then, the conclusion will of necessity also be true. On this understanding,
it is unsurprising why Aristotle will make the syllogistic the cornerstone of his theory
of scientific demonstration (see below, § 3.3).
In Prior Analytics I.28, Aristotle gives a schema to show how, given the appro-
priate premises, anything can be demonstrated through the figures. To demonstrate
something universally true of something else, for instance, Aristotle advises to “look
to the subject terms of which the predicate that is to be established is in fact said,
and to those which follow the term of which this term must be predicated,” in order
to discover equivalent terms (43b39–44). That is, if the desired conclusion is that
‘mortal’ belongs to every human being, one must look to what ‘mortal’ is predicated
of and to what is entailed by the term ‘human being’. If one finds any terms that
are the same, there will be a deduction for the desired conclusion (in Barbara); if
not, there will be no deduction. For different kinds of conclusion Aristotle suggests
searching for different kinds of premises. Indeed, he argues that, given a complete
set of preliminary facts about a particular subject, anything concerning the subject
that is demonstrable can be demonstrated through his syllogistic; and what cannot
be demonstrated can be proved indemonstrable:
If the facts concerning each [subject] have been grasped, already the
demonstrations are at hand for us to make plain. For if none of the things
that truly belong to the subjects has been left out of our collection of facts
(ἱστορίαν), then for everything for which there is a demonstration, we will
be able to find it and carry out the demonstration, and for everything
for which there is not naturally a demonstration, we will be able to make
this clear. (I.30, 46a22–27)
For Aristotle, then, the syllogistic is the only method of deduction needed to carry
out investigations. Indeed, he claims that his is the only method of deduction, and
that it is impossible to deduce through any other method (I.29, 45b36–46a2).
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Procedures (i)–(ii) comprise the method that Aristotle wants to distinguish from
division in I.31. The method of division by means of kinds to which Aristotle refers
there is closely associated with Platonic division, if not MD itself. It is likely that
Aristotle’s opponent in his refutation of division as a method of demonstration is
not only Plato, but also some of his associates in the Academy.49 In any event,
however, the following question arises: of which limb of Aristotle’s method does he
think division is a part? Does Aristotle think that MD fails as a method for (ii),
that it is a sort of imperfect syllogism, or (i), that it is a faulty means of arriving
at the set of facts required for deduction?50 I answer that Aristotle faults MD for
failing at both of the tasks he thinks are necessary for proper scientific inquiry, but
his focus in this chapter is its failure to satisfy (ii).
At the outset of I.31, Aristotle gives two reasons why division is “a sort of weak
syllogism”: “for [iii] what it must prove it asks for (αἰτε˜ιται), and [iv] it always deduces
something higher” (46a33–34). Aristotle’s arguments for these claims rely on the
conclusion he draws in I.23 that every valid deduction is reducible to a syllogism in
one of the three figures. On the basis of this claim, Aristotle can test the deductive
validity of MD by attempting to resolve it to a deduction in one of his figures. To
demonstrate (iii)–(iv), he gives as an example a partial division of human being:
Let A stand for animal, B for mortal, C for immortal, and let human
49Alexander understands Aristotle to be referring to Platonic division. He states that Aristotle
“is speaking about the art of division, which Plato used” (333, 10; tr. Mueller), but later suggests
that the method was widespread among Aristotle’s Academic contemporaries and predecessors; i.e.,
“the associates of Plato” (333, 23). Cf. Striker (2009, 208–209) and Smith (1989, 160).
50Alexander, at least, finds either possibility plausible (333, 12–20). Striker (2009, 209) notes
that there is evidence for either view: for the former there is Aristotle’s claim that the bulk of
his criticism in this chapter focuses on an argument that divisions cannot amount to a syllogistic
proof, but the fact that the criticisms come after Aristotle has just finished presenting his account
of how the premises of deductions are formulated attests to the latter view. She goes on to note
that commentators after Alexander tend to endorse one of these views while ignoring the other.
But given the scope of Aristotle’s critique of division, not only here but elsewhere in the Analytics,
it is likely that it does not correspond nicely with only one limb of Aristotle’s method, but rather
extends to both.
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being, the account of which must be grasped, be D. Now [division] takes
every animal to be either mortal or immortal, and this is to take every
A to be either B or C. And again, always dividing, it assumes (τίθεται)
human being to be an animal, so that it takes A to belong to D. Thus the
deduction is that every D will be either B or C, so that it is necessary
for human being to be either mortal or immortal. Yet it is not necessary
for it to be a mortal animal; rather, this is begged. But this was what
needed to be deduced. (46b3–12)
Aristotle thinks this division can be converted into a syllogism by taking ‘animal’ (A)
as the middle term, ‘mortal or immortal’ (B or C ) as the major term, and ‘human
being’ (D) as the minor term. On this interpretation the division can be put into a
first-figure deduction (Barbara). A comparison of the division and its corresponding
syllogism nicely illustrates Aristotle’s point (see Figure 3). Suppose we were to argue
A
B
D or else
C
D
B or C belongs to every A
A belongs to every D
Therefore, B or C belongs to every D
Figure 3: Comparison of Division and Syllogism of An. Pr. I.31
through division that humans are mortal animals. By positing human being in the
genus animal and taking the first differentiae of animal to be mortal and immortal, it
immediately follows that human being falls under either mortal or immortal.51 But
from these initial hypotheses it does not follow either that human being is a species
of mortal animal or a species of immortal animal. In order to put it under the desired
differentia an additional hypothesis is required, namely the assumption that human
51Indeed, for Aristotle this statement follows because it is the conclusion of the corresponding
syllogism. See 46b9–10, quoted above.
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being is a species of mortal animal. Recall from our discussion of Plato’s guidelines
for MD (§ 2.4) that, because Collection requires an assumption, a division can only
be as strong as its weakest assumption. Aristotle demonstrates this by resolving this
division into a first-figure syllogism, with the major premise stating that every animal
is mortal or immortal, the minor premise that every human being is an animal, and
the conclusion that every human being is either mortal or immortal. The division
does not demonstrate anything, but rather ends up assuming the very thing it set
out to prove, namely that human being is a species of mortal animal.
Thus, Aristotle’s resolution of the division into a first-figure deduction demon-
strates claim (iii). But what does he mean when he says that division “always deduces
something higher”? He explains that in a this sort of syllogism the middle term must
have a smaller denotation than the major term (46a39–b2). In the schema of I.28, the
middle term of a universal first-figure deduction is either wholly included in or wholly
excluded from the major term. But, as Figure 3 illustrates, the major term of the
syllogism corresponding to a division (the complex term ‘B or C ’) is instead wholly
included in the middle term (‘A’); mortal animal and immortal animal are included
in animal. Thus, division does the “opposite” of what a syllogism should do—instead
of looking at what the major term is predicated of, it deduces from something higher
up, i.e., entailed by, its major term. In other words, MD takes the universal (or
major) term as the middle and uses the middle term as the major (46b2–3).52 This
observation suffices to demonstrate claim (iv), but why should this pose a problem
for the deductive power of MD? Because Aristotle thinks he has already shown that
52Striker (2009, 210) notes that “[w]hat Aristotle says here is strictly speaking incorrect, for a
syllogism in Barbara will obviously also be valid if the major and middle term are coextensive.
This is in fact the case in the examples he gives, since he uses a complex term (B∨C) that must
have the same extension as the genus-term A.” It is likely, as Striker suggests, that this is simply
an oversight on Aristotle’s part, since B and C, taken individually, are smaller in scope than the
genus-term A.
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every valid deduction is expressible as a syllogism, the fact that divisions are not eas-
ily expressible as syllogisms belies their deductive power. Because demonstrations
through division fail to be resolved into a syllogistic deduction, they lack the deduc-
tive necessity that those performed through syllogism enjoy: “And the end—that this
is human being or whatever is being sought—they [sc., those who practice division]
never say clearly how it is necessary” (I.31 46b22–24). For Aristotle, then, MD is
incapable of attaining its stated goal of discovering definitions, for the conclusion of
a demonstration through division is not necessary.53
To summarize: Aristotle argues that MD is a “weak syllogism,” and hence “only
a small part” of his method of demonstration, because, when it is converted into a
syllogism (Barbara), it fails to deduce what the division aims to demonstrate. That is,
it fails to find an appropriate middle term through which a suitable deduction can be
carried out. Moreover, it fails to meet the condition that the major term of a universal
first-figure syllogism (with true premises) must have a wider denotation than the
middle term. As a result, MD lacks the property in virtue of which syllogisms
have their deductive power: the conclusion is not true because the premises are true.
Not only does division begin with the hypothesis that the definiendum falls under
some generic kind, but at every step it relies on an assumption, so that the whole
demonstration will be sound just in case each assumption is sound. For these reasons
Aristotle argues that practitioners of division misunderstand what division is good
for and use it in improper contexts (I.31, 46a34–39). His intention in arguing for
these claims is apparently to prove the superiority of his own deductive method over
that of his predecessors. Accordingly, he concludes I.31 by noting a number of tasks
53See 46a35–37: “they [sc., those who practice division] tried to convince us that it is possible for
a demonstration concerning substance, or what something is, to come about” (tr. Smith). As we
will see in the next section, Aristotle goes to great lengths to show that definitions are not subject
to demonstration.
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for which his method is useful but for which division is not well suited: refuting,
deducing statements about accidental properties and propria, and demonstrating
facts that were not previously known (46b26–29).
Of all of Aristotle’s polemics against MD in this chapter, perhaps the most
important is his claim that it cannot be used to demonstrate or deduce definitions.
That definitions are incapable of demonstration will be a central claim of Posterior
Analytics II, where we find Aristotle’s next set of attacks on division.
3.3 Further critiques of MD: An. Post. II.5–6
Posterior Analytics II.5 is sister to Prior Analytics I.31, to which the former makes
reference, for here too Aristotle issues a host of arguments againstMD. This chapter
comes in the course of an extended discussion of definition, in which Aristotle is
concerned to show that definitions cannot be deduced or demonstrated. Central
to his conception of science is the claim that not everything is understood through
demonstration (An. Post. I.3, 72b7–24). For, if all knowledge were demonstrative,
then the principles that serve as the premises of a syllogism would themselves be
subject to demonstration through syllogism. But then there must be some higher
premises from which these are demonstrated, and these too would be demonstrated
from other principles; clearly, an infinite regress of demonstration ensues.
To solve this problem and guarantee the soundness and necessity of the claims of
scientific knowledge, Aristotle avers that not all knowledge arises from demonstra-
tion. In particular, he identifies a class of statements as “unmediated propositions”
(πρότασις ἄμεσος) that are not known though demonstration from prior premises.
Such propositions are essential to scientific inquiry because they are the principles
of demonstration: “A principle of demonstration is an unmediated proposition, and
an unmediated proposition is one than which there is no other prior” (An. Post.
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I.2, 72a7–8). The word “unmediated” is important for understanding the connection
between scientific demonstration and syllogistic deduction, because for Aristotle a
demonstration is “a deduction from what is necessary,” i.e., a special kind of deduc-
tion in which the premises are necessary (I.4, 73a24). Because deductions are carried
out through the middle term, the claim that some propositions are unmediated (or,
more literally, ‘unmiddled’) suggests precisely that they are not the sort of thing that
can be established through demonstration. A demonstration is an explanation of why
something is the case, and as such, it always proceeds by means of a middle term (I.6,
75a1–3). In all scientific inquiry what is sought is the middle term, “for the middle
term is the explanation (αἴτιον)” (II.2, 90a6–7). Thus, insofar as unmediated propo-
sitions lack a middle term, they lack an explanation and hence are indemonstrable.
Rather, they must be discovered in a manner distinct from syllogistic deduction: “we
say that, not only is there knowledge, but some principle of knowledge, by which we
are made aware (γνωρίζομεν54) of definitions” (72b23–25).
Importantly, definitions are grouped in the class of unmediated propositions.55
54It may be important for understanding Aristotle’s solution to Meno’s paradox in Posterior
Analytics I that “nothing [...] prevents one from in a sense knowing and in a sense being ignorant
of what one is learning; for what is absurd is not that you should know in some sense what you
are learning, but that you should know it in this sense, i.e. in the way and sense in which you
are learning it” (71b6–8; tr. Barnes, with modifications). Ackrill suggests that Aristotle maintains
a distinction between knowing something (ἐπίστασθαι) in the way one knows the conclusion of a
deduction and becoming acquainted with it in a weaker sense: “one must truly believe (or ‘weakly
know’) that p if one is to make and bring to a successful conclusion the inquiry ‘p because of what?’;
one must be in possession of the answer to this inquiry if one is to count a knowing (or ‘strongly
knowing’ or ‘having scientific knowledge’) that p” (1981, 366 f.). If Ackrill is right, then knowledge
of definitions would be different in kind from knowledge of demonstrable propositions. In that case,
Aristotle’s claim that MD cannot demonstrate or deduce definitions would amount to the claim
that it does not yield this stronger kind of knowledge, but it would remain open whether it can
yield knowledge in the sense of acquaintance. See the discussion of An. Post. II.13 below (§ 3.4).
55Of course, definitions are not the only unmediated proposition. Definitions, on Aristotle’s
view, are always universal and affirmative propositions (II.3, 90b5). But the class of unmediated
propositions includes some negative propositions which cannot be definitions: “And just as there
are some non-demonstrable principles to the effect that this is this and this belongs to this, so too
there are some to the effect that this is not this and this does not belong to this ; so that there will
be principles to the effect that something is, and others to the effect that something is not” (I.23,
84b27–31; tr. Barnes).
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This fact is crucial to demonstration, for on Aristotle’s view the principles of demon-
stration are definitions (II.3, 90b25–28). It is therefore integral to Aristotle’s con-
ception of science that (v) there exists a class of indemonstrable propositions and
(vi) this class includes definitions that serve as the principles of demonstrations. In
Posterior Analytics II.3–10 Aristotle attempts to establish (vi). He argues for this
claim as follows:
There is not demonstration of that of which there is definition. For
definition is of what something is and its essence; but all demonstrations
apparently suppose and take up what something is, as mathematicians
[assume] what a unit is and what odd is, and similarly with the other
[sciences]. [...] So the definition should clarify (δηλο˜ι) what it is, and the
demonstration that this is or is not [true] of that. (90b29–91a2)
On Aristotle’s view, then, the content of definitions is categorically different from
the content of demonstrable propositions. The former make claims about the essence
of some object of knowledge, and the latter make claims about its attributes and
relationships to other terms. The latter, moreover, depend on the former so far as
they supply the necessary facts of the subject of inquiry. This body of facts in turn
serves as the starting point of deductions. Consequently, to attempt to demonstrate
a definition of something would require assuming just what one is attempting to
prove, namely, its essential nature (II.4, 91a14–31).
This notion of demonstration puts Aristotle fundamentally at odds with what he
takes to be the aim of MD: to demonstrate the definition of a term designating a
natural kind.56 Thus, to defend his conception of scientific knowledge, and in particu-
56Does Plato share Aristotle’s view that MD is means of demonstrating a definition? It is
difficult to argue that Plato understands demonstration in the same way that Aristotle defines
it, but Aristotle’s word for demonstration (ἀπόδειξις), and the cognates thereof, does appear in
the Sophist and Statesman, most notably at Sph. 261a, and at Plt. 273e and 284d. Nowhere in
these dialogues does Plato explicitly refer to division as a form of demonstration, but the some of
these passages might be interpreted as referring to the argument by MD as a demonstration. At
Sph. 261a, for instance, the Visitor states that in the course of the division he might be able to
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lar claim (vi), against the rival conception that focuses on demonstrating definitions
through division, Aristotle must argue that MD is incapable of demonstrating or
deducing definitions. In II.5–6 Aristotle takes up this issue, and once again argues
that division is not a form of deduction. Though division may arrive at an account
of the definiendum,
it [vii] never becomes necessary for the thing to be this when these are
the case, just as one giving an induction does not demonstrate. For one
must not ask for the conclusion, nor must it be given that it is this.
[...] For [viii] what prevents all this from being true of human being, yet
not making clear what it is or what it is to be it? Moreover, [ix] what
prevents either positing something additional, or taking something away,
or omitting something of its substance? (II.5, 91b14–27)
In (vii), Aristotle again faults division for lacking deductive necessity. But in (viii)–
(ix), he illustrates the implications of this failure. Though one may arrive through
division at an account of, say, human being, in virtue of what does this account
comprise the specific definition of human being? Recall that the Stranger’s first six
divisions of the sophist are inadequate because they fail to generate agreement on
his precise expertise. If the sophist truly constitutes a natural kind, then there must
be a single account of the sophistic expertise.57 Aristotle’s point against this kind of
reasoning is that, even if one arrives at a single account of human being, there is no
reason why this account elucidates its substance. For, as (ix) suggests, though this
account may say something true about a human being, there is nothing about the
division that guarantees the account will contain everything required of a definition.
“demonstrate (ἀποδείξαντες) that we can entangle the sophist in it [sc., falsity].” This statement
might be read as suggesting that the final division of the sophist as a kind of insincere imitator is
a demonstration that the sophist is associated with falsity. But neither this speculation, nor any
of these passages, constitute decisive evidence. I prefer to remain agnostic on the matter, letting it
suffice that Aristotle understands MD to be a sort of demonstration.
57See Sophist 232a: “...if somebody takes him to be an expert at many things, then that observer
can’t be seeing clearly what it is in his expertise that all of those many pieces of learning focus on”
(tr. White).
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To the contrary, division rests on a set of assumptions about the account that is
to be demonstrated, and clearly these assumptions cannot ground any claim about
the sufficiency of the resulting definition. There always lingers the possibility that
the division left something out of, or put something extraneous into, the resulting
account. By contrast, a demonstration possesses deductive necessity, in virtue of
which its conclusion is as certain as its indemonstrable premises. Thus, so far as
division cannot be a demonstration, it cannot be used to demonstrate definitions.
Though he complains that “these [concerns] are disregarded” by advocates of MD,
Aristotle argues that the conclusions of a division may possess a sort of deductive
necessity if the following three criteria are met: “[x] assuming (λαμβάνειν) everything
in what it [sc., the definiendum] is, [xi] making the division successive by assuming
(αἰτούμενον) what is primitive, and [xii] leaving nothing out” (91b28–30). Aristotle
will not elaborate on these criteria for proper division until he takes up the issue
of how to hunt for definitions in II.13, so we will save a detailed discussion of them
until the next section. But here Aristotle contends that, even if division is carried
out properly in accordance with (x)–(xii), it would still fall short of a demonstration
of definition. That is, even if the division succeeds in making something known
(γνωρίζειν58 ποιε˜ι), each step still relies on an assumption, for which reason it is
possible to ask, why must this be the case (91b34–92a2)? This will require the divider
to explain the reasoning behind each assumption, but all that can be explained is
that, if (for instance) human being is a species of animal, then it must be either
mortal or immortal. But even with the support of this reasoning, Aristotle thinks
the definition still will not have been demonstrated: “For the whole of this sort of
account is not a definition, so that even if it were demonstrated, still the definition
58On the connection between this term and Aristotle’s account of scientific knowledge, see note
54 above.
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would not be a deduction” (92a3–5). The definition will not have been deduced
from necessary premises, but rather from questionable assumptions. And such an
argument, on Aristotle’s view, falls short of a demonstration.
In the end, Aristotle’s thinks MD leaves us with the same questions that the
division was supposed to answer. Division proceeds by assuming the differentiae
that belong to the definiendum’s genus at each step of the division, so that the
divider ultimately construes the assumptions made throughout the procedure as the
elements of the definiens. This, as we saw, is why Aristotle rejects MD as a kind
of deduction. But in II.6, he goes beyond these criticisms to offer a reason why
division also fails at formulating definitions. In every case of division, the same sort
of question arises: “why will human being be a two-footed terrestrial animal and not
animal and terrestrial? For on these assumptions there is no necessity that what is
predicated becomes a unity, but it could be just as if the same person were both
musical and literate” (92a29–33). Notice that the necessity Aristotle here is calling
for is different from the deductive necessity that characterizes proper syllogism. A
definition, recall, is an account that signifies the substance of a thing. Because a
substance possesses a natural unity, so should its account. And for Aristotle, an
account can possess a unity in one of two ways: “either by connection, like the Iliad,
or by making one thing clear of one thing non-accidentally” (II.10, 93b35–36; tr.
Barnes). Because a definition is an account of something’s substance and essence,
it cannot possess the former kind of unity, but must consist in the definiendum
partaking of the account non-accidentally. However, Aristotle cannot find a reason
why the various elements of a definition by division can be said to possess such an
essential unity. Thus, he concludes, this method is unsuited to the task of definition.
This argument plainly goes beyond the logical criticisms brought up in Prior
Analytics I.31 and Posterior Analytics II.5. Now MD fails as a means for demon-
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strating definitions, not only because it assumes exactly what it is meant to prove
and lacks the deductive necessity requisite for scientific demonstration, but also be-
cause the sort of account it produces lacks a certain unity that an account of a thing’s
substance requires. For Aristotle’s present purposes—i.e., defending his claim (vi)
that definitions are unmediated, and hence indemonstrable, propositions—it suffices
to show that MD does not present a challenge to his conception of scientific inquiry,
so he quickly turns from this issue to other questions about definition. To under-
stand the force of Aristotle’s criticism, therefore, we will have to look beyond II.6.
When Aristotle turns in II.13 and Parts of Animals I.2–3 to the question of how
one ought to search for definitions, he seems to elaborate a procedure whereby an
account resulting from division can possess the requisite unity. But questions still
remain: why does Aristotle think the account of a substance requires such a unity,
and in what does this unity consist? Why, moreover, does not Plato require the
same thing of his definitions? These questions cannot be adequately addressed until
we examine Aristotle’s conception of proper division, but then they will arise again
with even more urgency.
3.4 Revising MD: An. Post. II.13 and PA I.2–3
That definitions are indemonstrable is a central component of Aristotle’s conception
of scientific inquiry, and in Posterior Analytics II.5 he defends this claim against the
practitioners of division who attempt, on his view, to demonstrate definitions through
the division of kinds. Having distinguished MD from his own analytic method of
deduction on the grounds that the former lacks the deductive necessity characterizing
the latter and constituting its value for scientific demonstration, Aristotle proceeds
in II.13 to lay out “how one must hunt for what is predicated in what a thing is,” that
is, how to discover the elements of a defining account (96a22–23). His procedure for
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discovering definitions relies on the predication/partaking relation between genera
and species he introduced in the Topics.
We saw that for Aristotle an account of a thing’s substance consists in all the
things in its genus that, taken together, are predicated universally and uniquely of
the definiendum. But many of these extend beyond the definiendum in question and
are predicated of other species:
Of the things that always belong to a thing, some extend further than it,
though not outside of its genus. [...] Well, such things must be taken up
to the first point at which so many are taken that each of them belongs
further, but altogether do not belong further; for this necessarily is the
substance of the object. (96a24–35)
He gives as an example the definition of ‘triplet’: “a number that is odd, prime,
and prime in this sense” (96a38).59 Number is the genus of triplet, so it applies,
in addition to triplet, to every other species that partakes of it. The differentiae
odd, prime, and (other) prime, being qualities of number, are less comprehensive
than number, but they are predicated of more species than triplet. What makes
this account of triplet a unique account of its substance is that, when the genus and
these differentiae are taken together, the resulting compound is predicated of only
the species triplet. Thus, when the account of a species is sufficient to constitute its
definition, wherever it obtains, so too will its objects (II.16, 98b29–32).
For all its failures as a method of deducing or demonstrating definitions, Aristotle
maintains that, under the appropriate conditions, division can be useful for hunting
down and discovering definitions:
To establish (κατασκευάζειν) a definition through divisions, one must aim
for three things: [xiii] taking what is predicated in what a thing is, [xiv]
59Aristotle distinguishes two senses of ‘prime’: in one sense as “not being measured by a number”
and in the other as “not being composed from numbers” (96a36–37).
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arranging these as first or second, and [xv] ensuring that these are every-
thing. (97a23–26)
Notice first that (xiii)–(xv) parallel the three criteria (x)–(xii) given in II.5 for furnish-
ing divisions with a sort of deductive necessity. Here Aristotle details these criteria.
With the help of some complementary remarks from Parts of Animals I.2–3, we may
outline Aristotle’s three criteria for successful division.
(1) Assume the appropriate genus and all the relevant differentiae. As we saw,
these are the elements of a definition of a thing’s substance. Aristotle indicates that
a division meets this criterion when the divider is able “to establish [conclusions]
through the genus” (97a27–28). The species to be defined must therefore be assumed
to partake of the proper genus, and the genus must be populated by the various
differentiae that separate the species that partake of it. If one assumes both the
proper genus and all the differentiae of which the definiendum partakes, then one
will have identified all the elements in its definition.
Proper collection is thus a crucial component of a successful division. In II.13,
97b7–15 Aristotle makes some suggestions for identifying a common genus for things
by looking at their similarities. First, we should look at similar things and ask what it
is that makes them similar. Having found this common account (i.e., the account of
the genus),60 we should look next to the things which we supposed to partake of this
account, paying attention to their various similarities and differences and grouping
the similar things together under the same species. Division proceeds by looking
60Like Plato, Aristotle warns us not to pay too much heed to names: “Now at present we argue
in terms of the common names that have been handed down; but we must not only inquire in
these cases, but also if anything else has been seen to belong in common, we must extract that and
then inquire what it follows and what follows it” (II.14, 98a13–19; tr. Barnes). It is unclear what
Aristotle means by “at present we argue in terms of common names,” but perhaps he is referring
to the style of dialectical argumentation for which he apparently wrote the Topics as a manual.
Alternatively, Barnes suggests that Aristotle is “referring to the ways of contemporary biologists,
who limit themselves to attributes expressible by a single common term” (1994, 251).
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for differences in the species, dividing when necessary, until we arrive “at a single
account: for this will be the definition of the object” (97b12–13). Of course, arriving
at this single account entails that we have accurately classified the definiendum
under differentiae that actually divide up the genus into kinds, so successful division
depends on selecting the correct differentiae. Fortunately, in Parts of Animals I.2–3,
Aristotle elaborates on how to select the differentiae that will distinguish natural
kinds. Though many of his remarks are applicable only to divisions of biological
species, we will focus on those that may be understood to apply to every case of
division.
The guiding principle for selecting differentiae is that “it is not proper to break
apart a single genus, like birds, with some in this and others in that subdivision, as is
the case in the published divisions” (I.2, 642b10–12). For Aristotle, this immediately
rules out dichotomous division, which he thinks invariably leads to the breaking-
up of unified species (b16–20). He also argues that dichotomous division requires
one differentia to be a privative, as Plato’s example of the division of human being
into ‘Greek’ and ‘barbarian’ illustrates (though of course Plato would not agree that
dichotomous division requires that one differentia be a privative). The problem is
that a privative differentia cannot be further divided: “for it is impossible for there
to be species of a negation, for instance of footless or featherless, as there are for
feathered and footed” (I.3, b22–24). Thus, placing privative differentiae at higher
orders of generality stops the division before the individual species can be located.61
Aristotle advises instead that “one must divide the one straightaway by a plurality
[of differentiae],” for then one will have access to privative differentiae at lower orders
61See Balme (1981, 75): “Aristotle argues that a privation cannot stand either (a) as a general
differentia or (b) as a particular differentia; and (c) since it cannot be further divided, it blocks the
division at that point, so that the forms to be defined will outnumber the the final differentiae that
can be available.”
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of generality, when they can be used to separate indivisible species (643b23–24). The
goal is to ensure that the division will be exhaustive, for which reason Aristotle also
advises that the differentiae must be opposites (a31). If the differentiae are mutually
exclusive and exhaustively divide the genus, then it is impossible for a species to
fall under more than one differentia for every order of generality. But ultimately,
Aristotle advises us to follow the same natural instincts that led human beings to
separate natural kinds in the first place (b10–13). By taking care to preserve the
unity of species, we are more likely to select differentiae that mark real distinctions
among them, and so also to take into account everything that must be included in
their respective definitions.
(2) Take the differentiae of a differentia. If one has selected the appropriate
genus for the definiendum and populated it with the appropriate differentiae, one’s
next task is to put the differentiae into the proper order of generality. As Plato
described this rule, one ought to make a division into narrow differentiae only when
one cannot find any broader differentiae into which to divide. But Plato did not offer
an account of the relationship between broader and narrower differentiae. Aristotle
takes this criterion one step further by making explicit the relationship that must
obtain between differentiae:
It will be ordered as it must be if one takes the first term. And this will
be the case, if one takes the one that follows all, but is not followed by
all; for there necessarily will be some such term. When this one is taken
it is the same way now for the lower terms: for the second will be first
among the others, and the third will be first of those the next; and having
taken away the highest one the next of the others will be first. (An. Post.
II.13, 97a28–34)
Once again, the important relationship bearing on differentiae is based on the pred-
ication/partaking relationship. In every case the first (i.e., highest or most general)
differentia will be the one whose account will be predicated of every other differ-
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entia, but which partakes of the account of no other (excepting the genus). The
next most general differentia will be the one that partakes only of the account of the
first term (and the genus) and is predicated of all the others. If this procedure is
carried through to its completion—i.e., its finding of a final differentia that uniquely
identifies the definiendum—the account of the final differentia will partake of every
higher-order differentia up to the first. Thus, the resulting account of the definien-
dum will contain the accounts of all of the differentiae that qualify it as a certain
species of the posited genus.
In the Parts of Animals, Aristotle explains the importance of this criterion: “the
continuity (συνέχεια) of differentiae from a genus along the division means that the
whole is a certain unity” (643b33–34). Aristotle’s claim that a definition possess
a non-accidental unity was noted in the previous section. Here he claims that, by
ordering differentiae such that a lower-order differentia partakes of all of the higher-
order differentiae, the resulting definition gets this essential unity. Recall also the
claim in Topics VI.6 that “each differentia imports its appropriate genus.” It is clear
how this might be the case if each differentia partakes of all the higher-order genera,
which in turn partake of the genus. In this case the genus is predicated of the species
in virtue of being predicated of its final differentia.62
(3) Leave nothing out of, and add nothing to, the definition. Aristotle thinks
that, by adhering to (1) and (2), it is assured that the division will lack nothing and
contain nothing superfluous (An Post. II.13, 97a35–b6). For, by (1), it is assumed
that the division contains the genus and the differentiae appropriate to the specified
definiendum, so that none of the elements of the definition have been left out. By
(2), moreover, the differentiae have been ordered in such a way that the narrower
62This assumption, that the highest-order differentia partakes of the genus, will be called into
question in the discussion of Aristotle’s solution to the unity of definition in Metaphysics VII.12
(see below, § 4.2).
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differentiae partake of the broader differentiae, which in turn partake of the genus.
Thus, on this view the final differentia plus genus that makes up a definition will
entail just those differentiae that are predicated of the former and partake of the
latter, so that no extraneous terms are added to the definition. Thus, the division
becomes necessary since, as Aristotle requires, “everything falls into the division and
nothing is left out” (II.5, 91b31–32).
These three criteria comprise Aristotle’s reformed Method of Division (MD*).
Its characteristic features differ in important respects from those of Platonic division
(MD). The principle difference is the predication/partaking relation that Aristotle
recognizes between species and their genera. Though he agrees with Plato that there
is a categorical difference between divisible and indivisible kinds, Aristotle goes on to
make explicit that only genera are predicated of species, and species are predicated
of nothing but their members. This allows Aristotle to elaborate on the proper
ordering of differentiae within a species based on this relationship. Thus, while MD
requires a fresh assumption, and an additional application of Collection, at each step
of the division, the order of differentiae according to MD* cannot be so questioned.
This is not to say, however, that MD* does not rely on any assumptions. To the
contrary, it relies on assuming both the genus and all the differentiae appropriate
to the specified definiendum. The difference is that these are the only requisite
assumptions for proper division, whereas MD requires both these assumptions and
an additional set of assumptions concerning the ordering of differentiae (or divisible
kinds). This difference moreover translates into different criteria for proper division.
Plato suggested dividing into as few parts as possible in order to avoid fragmenting
a naturally unified kind. But Aristotle retorts that dichotomous division does just
that, and additionally groups together loose collections of species under indivisible
privative differentiae. In MD*, the general rule is not to make as few divisions as
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possible, but to make the divisions exhaustive and mutually exclusive.
In virtue of these criteria for proper division, MD* enjoys a sort of deductive
necessity on which the definition resulting from a division is true when the initial
assumptions are true. But furthermore, Aristotle wants to claim that only on his
account can divisions produce definitions possessing a non-accidental unity. Without
the central partaking relation, division lacks an account of how a final differentia can
“import” higher-order differentiae and, ultimately, the genus. This is a criterion for
division that does not rely on Aristotle’s logical theory, but rather on his claim that
a definition is an account of a thing’s substance. Insofar as a substance possesses
a natural unity, he maintains, so should its account. To understand Aristotle’s
motivation for this view, we must look beyond his logical and scientific works to
examine his ontology of substance. This will be the task of the final section.
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4. CONCLUSION: ARISTOTLE ON DIVISION II
The last section ended with an unresolved question about the reasoning behind Aris-
totle’s demand for the unity of a definition. We saw that most of his criticisms of
MD arise from his syllogistic conception of scientific demonstration and logical de-
duction. Because analysis of a demonstration by division into a syllogistic deduction
fails, Aristotle concludes that it lacks the deductive necessity characteristic of sci-
entific demonstration. Moreover, Aristotle wants to maintain that some statements,
importantly those that serve as the premises of demonstrations, are incapable of
demonstration. For this reason too he argues that definitions formulated through
division are not thereby deduced or demonstrated. We were unable, however, to find
a similar motivation for Aristotle’s claim that definitions must possess a unity, which
gives rise to his contention that definition by division does not account for the unity
of its object.
To understand Aristotle’s reasoning on this point, we will look in this section at
his discussion of definitions by division in theMetaphysics. In light of this discussion,
I will suggest that Aristotle’s demand that a definition account for the unity of its
object stems from his ontological commitment to the unity of form. He meets this
demand in the case of definitions from division by arguing that the definition of a
substance consists in a simple predicate, namely the final differentia of its species.
This argument relies on the second criterion of MD*, that the differentiae be ordered
successively according to non-accidental attributes, as well as an obscure claim that
the genus will be entailed by the final differentia either if it does not exist apart
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from its species or if it exists as matter. This latter claim will turn out to be
very difficult to understand, as a survey of competing interpretations will attest.
However, it will emerge from this discussion that, on any plausible interpretation,
Aristotle’s methodological remarks on division highlight the central role his account
of definition occupies in his ontology. We will consider an objection to the Platonic
Forms from Aristotle’s discussion of the unity of definition in Metaphysics VIII.6
that will illustrate the relationship between Aristotle’s conception of substance and
his account of proper division (MD*). Aristotle argues, I suggest, that the Platonic
account of definition cannot account for the unity of its object precisely because it
presupposes the Platonic theory of Forms. Before we inquire into the relation between
Aristotle’s methodological critique of MD and his substance ontology, however, we
must understand why Aristotle thinks the unity of the object of definition poses a
problem for the Method of Division.
4.1 The problem of unity in Met. VII.12
The problem Aristotle raises in Posterior Analytics II.6 about the unity of definition
is not resolved there. The chapter ends aporetically with the concern that a definition
could look “just as if the same person were both musical and literate” (92a32–33).
The solution that a definition is a unity when at every step of the division the
selected differentia is a differentia of the immediately higher differentia is offered in
the methodological discussion of Parts of Animals I.3, but the problem gets its fullest
treatment in Metaphysics VII.12.
Here Aristotle undertakes to address definition “inasmuch as it was not addressed
in the Analytics” (1037b8–9). He asks again what it is that makes a definition a
unity, but goes on to elaborate why it will not suffice for a definition to possess
only the sort of incidental unity that obtains, for instance, when the same person
66
possesses the attributes ‘musical’ and ‘literate’:
In virtue of what is it one, the account of which we call a definition?63
For instance ‘two-footed animal’ for human being (let this be the account
of human being): in virtue of what is this one and not many, animal and
two-footed? Concerning ‘human’ and ‘pallid’ there is a plurality when
one does not belong to the other, but a unity when it belongs and the
subject, the human, has a certain attribute. For then a unity comes
about and there is a pallid human. But [i] here one does not partake
(μετέχει) of the other, for the genus is not thought to partake of the
differentiae. For then it would partake of opposites at the same time,
since it is opposite differentiae that divide the genus. But [ii] even if it
does partake [in them] the same argument applies, if the differentiae are
many, for instance footed, two-footed, wingless. On what account are
these one and not many? [iii] It is not because they belong [to the same
thing], for in this way a unity will be [made] out of anything. (1037b11–
24)
There are a number of arguments in this passage. As in Posterior Analytics II.6,
Aristotle contrasts the unity of subject and attribute and the unity of definition. In
virtue of belonging to the same subject ‘musical’ and ‘literate’ may be one. Similarly,
a person, as subject, and an attribute like pallor may be one in virtue of the latter
belonging to the former. And in general, as (iii) indicates, this sort of unity can obtain
between any set of attributes predicated of the same subject. The unity of subject
and attribute described here corresponds to an account of accidental predication
developed in the Posterior Analytics. For Aristotle something is an accident if it is
said of some underlying subject (ὑποκειμένος) (I.4, 73b8–10). Accidents always are
predicated of some subject but are not included in the account of what that subject
is. A subject’s accidental predicates, in other words, are not a part of its essence:
63Is Aristotle discussing the unity of a definition or its object? This sentence, at least, suggests
that he is primarily concerned with the unity of the definiendum, the substance whose account is
called a definition. This understanding certainly fits the broader context of Metaphysics VII, which
is a extended discussion of substance. However, VII.12 is concerned explicitly with the unity of
definition which, he will argue, is necessary to account for the unity of its object. This interpretive
question may not be so pressing, however, for we will see that Aristotle wants to maintain that the
unity of a definition is the same in kind as the unity of its object.
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For human is not what pallid is or what a sort of pallid is, but presumably
is an animal; for human is what animal is. But what does not signify
substance must be predicated of some subject, and there is nothing pallid
which is not pallid through being something different. (I.22, 83a28–32)
For a person to be musical or pallid says nothing about what that person is, since by
definition an accident is predicate of what is different from it. What a person is is
different from what musical and pallid are and, generally, different from everything
accidentally predicated of her.64
Clearly, then, definitions cannot be one in the same way that that a subject and
its attributes are one. A definition, recall, is an account of what a thing is essentially,
so it does not account for the accidental properties of the definiendum. In 1037b11–
24, Aristotle gives two arguments in support of this claim. He argues in (i) that the
elements of a definition are not related to one another as subject and (accidental)
attribute. If it were, the genus would act as a subject and the differentiae as its
attributes. Notice, first, that this is the inverse of the partaking relation in the
Topics.65 On that account, the differentiae (qua subordinate genera) partake of the
genus, but not the genus of the differentiae. Moreover, as we saw (§ 3.4) and as
Aristotle here affirms, the differentiae that divide up a genus are opposites—that is
why they exhaustively divide the genus such that each species fits under exactly one
differentia. If the genus partakes of the differentiae as a subject partakes of a set of
attributes it would, absurdly, possess contrary attributes at the same time. Hence,
64Barnes understands Aristotle to be arguing in this section of An. Post. I.22 that “non-
substantial predications are non-essential and so (in one of the many senses of the term) incidental”
(1994, 177). It follows that non-substantial predications, as illustrated in the passage quoted above,
do not signify the substance of their subject. Barnes notes that “a crude account of ousia might
say, without being unduly misleading, that ousia is ambiguous between ‘essence’ and ‘substance” ’
(Ibid.). On the interpretation developed below, Aristotle is claiming (minimally) that accidental
predicates do not say anything about the essence of their subject. It follows, I shall argue, that this
precludes the idea that a definition, which does signify the substance of its definiendum, possesses
the sort of unity that obtains between subject and attribute.
65See § 3.1 above.
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Aristotle concludes that the unity of the parts of a definition is different in kind from
the unity of subject and attribute.
Furthermore, and perhaps more to the point, he argues in (ii) that this account
of unity is inadequate for the task for which the unity of definition is required.
In the case presently under consideration, in which the definition of human being
is stipulated as ‘two-footed animal’, the defining account is a complex statement
consisting of the genus-term ‘animal’ and the differentia-term ‘two-footed’. Aristotle
argues that, even if genus and differentia were related as subject to attribute, we
are faced with the same problem because the defining account is composed of many
parts. For these parts to compose a definition they must have an intrinsic connection
stronger than the incidental connection between ‘musical’ and ‘literate’ or ‘human’
and ‘pallid’.66 This is suggested by the sentences that immediately follow 1037b11–
24:
But surely whatever is included in the definition must be one, for a defi-
nition is a single account and [an account of] a substance, so it must be
an account of a unity. For substance signifies a ‘one’ and a ‘this’, as we
say. (1037b24–27)
The unity required of a definition must correspond to the unity of its object. Con-
sequently, just as the unity of a substance cannot be explained by appeal to the
subject-attribute relation, the unity expressed in the statement ‘two-footed animal’
cannot be explained by positing ‘animal’ and ‘two-footed’ as attributes of a common
subject. The parts of a definition, in other words, must possess an intrinsic and
non-accidental unity.67
66See Code (unpublished ms, 4): “Insofar as the two predicables themselves [sc., ‘literate’ and
‘musical’] indicate some kind of unity, this is due simply to the fact that they both apply to a single
subject. It is not due to any intrinsic relation between these two predicables. There is a unity when
there is some one other thing (i.e., a man) that happens to be characterized by both. That unity
(the unity indicated when we say of a man that he is both musical and literate) is for Aristotle
accidental.”
67See Ibid., 5: “...although it is true to say of a man that he is footed and it is true to say of a
69
Aristotle’s solution to the problem of unity in this chapter echoes the solution
he offers in Parts of Animals I.3 in that it depends on the final differentia entailing
the superordinate differentiae. But here he will make the stronger claim that, in
a proper division, “the last differentia will be the substance of the thing (ἡ οὐσία
του˜ πράγματος) and the definition” (1038a19–20). This conclusion of VII.12 comes
after an extended discussion of definition, its parts, and its relation to substance. In
Metaphysics VII.10–11 in particular, Aristotle treats the parts of substance and the
question of which of these are included in the account of its essence. In order fully
to grasp Aristotle’s solution and its relation to division, then, we must take a brief
digression into this discussion of substance and the parts of definition in Metaphysics
VII.
In the Categories Aristotle considers the term ‘substance’ to apply primarily to
individual objects (see, e.g., Cat. 5). It is not obvious, however, whether he main-
tains this understanding in the discussion of substance in Metaphysics VII. In this
discussion, a substance is considered primarily as an independent (i.e., nonpredi-
cable), and self-subsistent entity (VII.6), and it is apparent that the term refers
additionally to entities other than individual objects. In VII.3, ‘substance’ is taken
to indicate either the form (εἶδος) of an object or the object itself, conceived as a uni-
fied compound of form and matter (1029a27–30). Of these two notions of substance,
Aristotle considers the form of the object to be more basic because it exists prior
to the compound substance (a6–7). A substance (in this basic sense) is identical to
its essence (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) (VII.6, 1031b18–21), and the essence of each substance is
“what it is said [to be] in itself (καθ’ αὑτό)” (VII.4, 1029b14). Aristotle concludes,
man that he is an animal, the predicate ‘footed animal’ must be unified in a stronger manner, and
a footed animal cannot be merely an accidental unity. The unity indicated by the predicate should
not consist merely in the fact that each of the two constituent predicables applies to one and the
same subject in such a way that that subject (the man) happens to be footed and happens to be
an animal.”
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as the Greek might suggest, that “nothing which is not a species (εἶδος) of a genus
will have an essence, but [it will belong] only to these” (1030a11–13; tr. Ross, with
modifications). Because essence is identical with form, it will also be identical with
the species of which the substance partakes.
Here, as in Topics I,68 Aristotle understands definition to be an account of what
a thing is, i.e., its essence (VII.5, 1031a12–13). Accordingly, a definition will be
an account of both the substance itself and its corresponding species. He describes
an adequate account of a substance’s essence as one “in which the word [sc., the
word denoting the definiendum] is not present, but in which its meaning is expressed
(λέγοντι)” (1029b19–20). A defining account, in other words, should be substitutable
for the term denoting the thing itself (cf. An. Post. II.16, 98b29–32)—to use
Aristotle’s own example, if the account of ‘white surface’ is ‘smooth surface’ then
‘white’ is equivalent to ‘smooth’. Moreover, because only substances strictly speaking
have essences, only substances strictly speaking are definable (VII.4, 1030b5–6). And
since a substance is identical with its essence, in the basic sense of ‘substance’ an
account of a thing’s essence will be an account of its form or εἶδος.
On this understanding of substance, it is plain why a definition must possess
unity. Its object, the essence or form of an object—and that which it shares with
the other members of its species—is, as Aristotle puts it, a ‘one’ and a ‘this’. If a
defining account should be able to stand in for its definiendum, then it must possess
an intrinsic unity sufficient to account for its object being a ‘one’ and a ‘this’ (VII.4,
1030b8–11). So the unity that Aristotle is looking for in the case of definitions is
substantial unity.69 The stipulated definition of human being in VII.12 consists of
68For the account of definition given there, see § 3.1 above.
69Substantial predication is precisely not accidental predication: “the things signifying a substance
signify of what they are predicated of just what is that thing or just what is a particular sort of
it; but the things which do not signify a substance but are said of some other underlying subject
which is neither just what is that thing nor just what is a particular sort of it, are accidental, e.g.
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two elements, the genus-term ‘animal’ and the (final?) differentia-term ‘two-footed’.
In VII.10–11 Aristotle discusses the parts of a substance and the parts of definition
at length. He identifies three categories of parts of a substance: parts of the matter,
parts of the “εἶδος,” and parts of the compound (10, 1034b34–1035a5).70 These parts
are distinguished by their priority with respect to the substance they comprise. The
parts of the εἶδος are distinguished in that they are prior to the substance itself and
essential to it. To the question of which of these parts are parts of the account of the
substance, Aristotle answers that “all the parts of the account and those into which
the account is divided are prior, either all or some of them” (1035b4–6). Thus, only
parts of the εἶδος are included in the definition.
VII.12 explicitly identifies genus and differentiae as parts of the definition (1037b29–
30), and this view is consistent with the claim in the Topics that the formula for a
definition is genus plus final differentia (VI.3, 143b8–9). So, in order for the genus-
term ‘animal’ and the differentia-term ‘two-footed’ to comprise a definition of human
being they must constitute a unity sufficient for it to account for the unity of the
form of the human species. In other words, there must be a principle, analogous to
white of the man” (An. Post. I.22, 83a24–29; tr. Barnes). Cf. Code (unpublished ms, 28): “It is
not just that the predicate in a definition must signify a unity. It must signify an intrinsic unity as
opposed to an accidental unity. This in turn is required because a definition says of some definable
object what it is in its own right, intrinsically. However, the definable object itself would not be an
intrinsic unity if the only account saying what it is has parts that are related in non-intrinsic and
accidental ways. If the account saying what man is fails to express an intrinsic unity, and yet this is
the account that gives the being of the item in question, then the object of the account, man, also
fails to be an intrinsic unity. But in that case it cannot be a substance.” On Code’s understanding
of the problem, the key seems to be that a definition ought to be a unique account of the substance
defined (cf. Topics VI.4, 141a35). If that unique account fails to possess an intrinsic unity, then so
too must its object.
70Devereux (2009) argues for a fourth (quasi-) category of parts, the “functional parts” of a living
organism. He suggests that functional parts, like parts of the form, are distinct from homoeomerous
material parts because they are essential to the organic substance. In this sense, “functional parts
are formal parts” that are distinct insofar as they indicate something about the activity of the
organism (14). I admittedly am unclear exactly what Devereux has in mind as functional parts,
but if a part of the form like two-footedness qualifies as a functional part it may explain why it
ought to be included in the definition of human being despite making reference to the matter of
the body.
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the principle that two attributes are one in virtue of belonging to the same subject,
that explains why the predicates ‘animal’ and ‘two-footed’ can coherently be com-
bined into a unified whole, a ‘two-footed animal’.71 The question of VII.12, then, is,
what makes these distinct terms into a substantial unity?
Aristotle’s answer to this question is that, for definitions generated from proper
division, there really is no problem of unity: “Then if there is a differentia of a dif-
ferentia [at each step of the division], one, the final [differentia], will be the form
(εἶδος), that is, the substance” (1038a25–26).72 If the division proceeds according to
71It might be questioned whether Aristotle thinks such an account could be adequate for a
definition of human being. In VII.11, only a few paragraphs before 12, he indicates that the
defining account of an organism will be an account of its soul (1035a14–21). It is hard to imagine
that ‘two-footed animal’ could stand as a definition of the human soul, so one might be tempted
to conclude that division is wholly inadequate to furnish a defining account of an organism. This
is the view that Code (unpublished ms) defends: “...the definition by division is not the account
that captures the being or ousia of man. The definition by division may well be a necessarily
true proposition that classifies the species by isolating a factor that distinguishes it from the other
members of its kind [i.e., the final differentia], but it does not capture the ousia of the definable
item” (40).
Of course, the definition of human being as ‘two-footed animal’ in VII.12 is suggested only
for illustrative purposes and is clearly an inadequate defining account; it would group humans
with other bipeds in the genus animal, whereas a definition ought to single out only the species
human being. But even with a complete division and a suitable final differentia of human being, it
might still be doubted that such an account can constitute the definition of the human soul. This
consideration is immaterial to the present question of the unity of definition, but if correct it would
suggest that Aristotle is not confident at all in the ability of division, even on MD*, to generate
suitable definitions.
72Ross translates this sentence “If then a differentia of a differentia be taken at each step, one
differentia—the last—will be the form and the substance;” and Bostock translates it “So then, if
each new differentia is a differentia of the previous one, there will be one last differentia and it will
be the form and the substance.” I agree with Bostock’s understanding of Aristotle’s solution: “a
properly formulated definition will reduce to its last differentia alone, so there is really no problem
over how its parts ‘form a unity’, for it does not actually have distinct parts at all” (1994, 183). I
deviate from his translation for two reasons. First, following Ross’ translation, I want to make clear
that Aristotle’s solution is specific to definitions arising out of division. I will argue (§ 4.2 below)
that Aristotle’s solution to the problem rests on two claims, one of which we have already identified
as a criterion for proper division on MD*. Thus the efficacy of this solution for definitions not
arising from division is questionable. But this is not to say I disagree with Bostock, for he even
acknowledges this point, arguing that Metaphysics VII.12 and VIII.6 offer incongruous solutions
to the problem of unity (see his 1994, esp. 176 f., 183 f.). Second, in light of conclusion of the
foregoing discussion that the object of definition is an indivisible natural kind, i.e., the species of
some genus, I read the ‘καὶ’ in ‘τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἡ οὐσία’ as epexegetical. Given that the discussion of
VII is about division, I think the only sense of οὐσία Aristotle has in mind is the one on which it is
the form of an individual object. On this understanding, ‘substance’ would be equivalent to ‘form’.
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differentiae that are part of the essence of the species or substance being defined, then
the resulting account will identify the elements of its essence that make it a unique
member of its genus. Aristotle thinks this will be the case if, at each step of the di-
vision, the divider selects differentiae of the differentia under which the definiendum
has been placed. Otherwise, he warns, the divider will select accidental attributes
as differentiae—as when we divide ‘footed’ into ‘pallid’ and ‘dark’ (a27). Then the
division will not yield a unified account, for “the differentiae will be as many as there
are cuts (τομαὶ)” (a28; tr. Bostock). Thus, only if one divides by selecting subordi-
nate differentiae that non-accidentally qualify superordinate differentiae will the final
differentia that uniquely identifies the definiendum include them in its account. In
such cases, to state the final differentia would be elliptically to state the differentiae
it entails. And because the final differentia is equivalent to the form and essence of
the substance, the definiens will be a unity in virtue of consisting of only one term.
Without a plurality of parts (i.e., a plurality of differentiae), the definition becomes
a simple predicate. Its unity, therefore, is secured through its simplicity.73
If this is Aristotle’s solution to the problem of the unity of definition, it gives
a stronger account of definitions from division than those he gives in the Topics,
Analytics, and Parts of Animals. In the next section, I will argue that this stronger
account depends on the methodological revisions to division characteristic of MD*,
as well as a reconsidered account of genus alluded to in VII.12. In the next section,
we will turn to Aristotle’s argument for the simplicity of definition to inquire how it
develops from these considerations.
73My understanding of Aristotle’s solution to the problem of unity follows closely that of Code.
Cf. Ibid., 32: “The ultimate answer to the question ‘What is man?’ would in that case simply
be ‘two-footed.’ This answer has none of the internal complexity of a definition by genus and
differentiae. Since it does not mention a plurality of parts, the question as to what unifies those
parts does not even arise. And if this is correct, then we have discovered the constituent element
in a definition by division that is that by which the parts are one.”
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4.2 MD* as a solution to the problem of unity
Aristotle’s conclusion that a definition formulated through division is a simple predi-
cate, namely the final differentia of the definiendum, depends on two claims: that (iv)
definitions generated through division need only comprise the differentiae (1037b29–
1038a8), and that (v) when the elements of a definition are so related that the sub-
ordinate differentiae are differentiae of the superordinate differentiae, the definiens
is reducible to the final differentia (1038a9–21). Let us first consider the argument
for the latter claim.
(v) On Aristotle’s revised Method of Division (MD*) a definition becomes nec-
essary when three criteria are met.74 First, the divider must assume the genus and
all the relevent differentiae that will comprise the definiens. Second, the differentiae
must be ordered successively such that a subordinate differentia always partakes of
the superordinate differentiae. Third, the divider must make sure that the resulting
definition contains all and only the requisite parts—of course, this criterion is met
just in case the other two are also met.
In VII.12, Aristotle elaborates on the second criterion for proper division accord-
ing to MD*. In the Analytics and Parts of Animals it was argued that the division
is successive when the subordinate genera partake of the superordinate genera. Here
he goes further to claim that “one must divide by the differentia of a differentia”
(1038a9–10). That is to say, the differentia of a higher differentia cannot be an acci-
dental attribute of it. Rather, it must correspond to an actual distinction in what it is
of itself.75 Only in this circumstance will the superordinate differetia be predicated of
its subordinates. Given the differentia ‘footed’, therefore, the divider should divide it
into “differentiae of the foot,” for instance, into cloven- or noncloven-footed (a15–16).
74See § 3.4 above for a detailed account of the three criteria of MD*.
75See note 69 above.
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Then clearly the subordinate differentiae will entail the superordinate differentiae—
for a substance to be cloven-footed entails that it is also footed.76 Thus, by following
this procedure the divider identifies an ordered class of differentiae in which each
term is entailed by its successor. If the defining account is to be complete the chain
of entailment relating the terms of this class must begin with the first differentia of
the genus and end with the final differentia that uniquely identifies the definiendum;
when the divider arrives by this procedure at what cannot further be differentiated,
the division and the class of relevant differentiae is complete (1038a16–17).
Aristotle argues that when divisions are carried out according to this procedure
only the last differentia will be the form and essence of the definiendum, for in
this case the superordinate genera are redundant: “it is not necessary to state these
[differentiae] many times over in the definition; for this is superfluous” (a20–21).
Given the partaking (and predication) relation on which successive differentiation
depends, it ought to follow that, insofar as the substance or species being defined
possesses a subordinate differentia, it ought to possess the differentiae higher up
along the chain of entailment—that a human is two-footed naturally entails that she
is footed, which naturally entails that she is..., which naturally entails that she is
terrestrial (assuming this is the first differentia of the highest genus ‘animal’ under
which ‘human being’ falls). Aristotle suggests this point is demonstrated by reversing
the order of the differentiae, for it is obviously redundant to say ‘two-footed and
footed’, but this is just what is said when both ‘footed’ and ‘two-footed’ are included
in the definiens (a30–34). Therefore, to include the intermediate differentiae is only to
76Granger (1980) suggests that, on this conception of the genus-species relation, the ordering
of successive differentiae corresponds to the determinable-determinate relationship. Thus, “cloven-
footed is a determinate of the determinable footed” (44). This relationship certainly obtains between
‘footed’ and ‘cloven-footed’, but it is unclear whether it will also obtain between other successive
differentiae like ‘footed’ and ‘manycleft’ (cf. PA 642b26–30). Though being manycleft with respect
to feet is a quality of footedness, it is not a determinate property like ‘cloven-footed’ is since it
admits of further division.
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restate what is already implied in the final differentia, so the whole class of differentiae
that strictly speaking are part of the account is expressed in only a single predicate.
In short, there is no internal complexity in the definiens at all.
(iv) To infer from this consideration that the whole definition consists in a single
predicate, however, Aristotle needs another premise. Recall that here as elsewhere a
definition is said to consist in the genus and the final differentia of the definiendum.
The argument for (v) is meant to show why the final differentia is sufficient to
express the whole class of differentiae that uniquely identifies the definiendum, but
what about the genus? How does it figure into the single predicate consisting of the
final differentia?
Aristotle argues that the genus does not introduce complexity into the definition
because “a definition is an account comprising the differentiae” (a8–9; tr. Ross,
with modifications). This claim might seem inconsistent with his earlier account of
definition as genus and final differentia, since the genus does not seem any longer
to be a part of the definition. Aristotle’s reasoning behind this claim is opaque,
but it is clear that he does not take it to conflict with his previous accounts of
definition—he even reaffirms this view in this chapter (1037b29–30).77 He argues
that a definition is made up only of differentiae if at least one of two statements
hold of the genus: “if, then, [vi] the genus without qualification (ἁπλω˜ς) does not
exist apart from the species which it as genus includes, or if [vii] it exists but exists
as matter—for the voice is genus and matter, but the differentiae make the species,
77The obscurity of Aristotle’s remarks on this point (1037b29–38a8) is notorious. See, e.g.,
Bostock 1994, 180 ff. Code reads these lines as supporting Aristotle’s claim that the genus cannot
be “the unifying substance of the thing” (unpublished ms, 31). If this is the purpose of that
passage, it is unclear to me why Aristotle should take the claims that “the genus does not exist in
an unqualified way over and above its species, or if it does, it does so only in the way that matter
does” to settle the issue (Ibid., 31n37). It seems to me more plausible that the purpose of these
two claims is to show that, as the intermediate differentiae are entailed by the final differentia, so
too is the genus, so that there need be no complexity in the defining account of a substance.
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i.e., the letters, from it)...” (1038a5–8; tr. Ross, with modifications). If the genus is
construed extensionally, statement (vi) is reasonably clear: each member of a genus is
a member of one of its species; hence, the genus exists only through its species. If this
is what Aristotle is getting at in (vi), then one immediately notices a connection with
the view given in Topics VI that, so far as each differentia “imports” its appropriate
genus, “each of the genera as well is true of that of which the differentia is true”
(144b18-19; tr. Pickard-Cambridge).78 Thus, as the superordinate differentiae are
entailed by their subordinates, so too will the highest genus that the definiendum
partakes of79 be entailed by the highest differentia entailed by the final differentia. It
of course follows that, in stating the final differentia, the definition elliptically states
the genus as well as the higher differentiae.80
Statement (vii), however, does not admit of such an easy interpretation. If the
genus exists as matter, why should it follow that a final differentia entails its genus?
This question is further complicated by Aristotle’s claim only a few lines earlier that
“there is some matter in everything which is not an essence and a bare form (εἶδος
αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ) but a ‘this” ’ (VII.11, 1037a1–2). To the extent that a definition is
an account of a thing’s essence and its form, it would seem to follow from this claim
that it lacks matter. But Aristotle seems to be arguing in VII.12 that the genus is
both matter and an element of the definition, so that the definition does have matter.
78See also Top. VI.5, 143a19–24: “The substance of a thing in each case involves its genus. This
[sc., passing over the genera in a definition] is the same as not putting the object into its nearest
genus; for the man who puts it into the nearest one has stated all the higher genera, seeing that
all the higher genera are predicated of the lower. Either, then, it ought to be put into its nearest
genus, or else to the higher genus all the differentiae ought to be appended whereby the nearest
genus is defined” (tr. Pickard-Cambridge).
79If Aristotle here maintains the same view of genus and differentia he presents in the Topics, it
is not possible that a differentia might entail competing genera. On the account given in Topics
I.15, each differetia unequivocally belongs to only one genus, so only one genus is invoked for every
differentia (107a18–30).
80Pace Bostock, who sees no reason why statement (vi) should support this conclusion (1994,
182).
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How does this thesis help him solve the problem at hand?
Aristotle evidently takes statements (vi)–(vii) to entail that the definition is only
an account of the differentiae on the basis of an obscure argument he gives earlier
in the chapter. He claims that “the other genera [i.e., the differentiae qua subor-
dinate genera] are the first [genus] and with this the differentiae collected with it
(αἱ συλλαμβανόμεναι διαφοραί)” (b30–32). Using the stipulated definition of human
being as an example, he explains that the first genus would be ‘animal’, next would
be ‘two-footed animal’, with another perhaps being ‘featherless two-footed animal’
(b32–33). On the basis of this illustration, it might be thought that what Aristotle
means by “the other genera” are in fact new, and narrower, genera constructed from
the first genus by adding differentiae to it.81 Thus we have, for instance, the narrow
genus ‘two-footed animal’ and the even narrower genus ‘featherless two-footed ani-
mal’. These would of course be subgenera of the first genus, but Aristotle’s point,
on this reading, would be that ultimately a genus with only one differentia, the final
differentia, would be included in the definiens. If a complex string of differentiae can
be resolved into a single genus plus single differentia, then it seems that Aristotle’s
conclusion follows. If, by (vi), the genus does not exist outside its species and, by
Topics 144b18-19, the genus is true of whatever its differentia is true of, then defini-
tion can plausibly be construed as an account of the differentiae, consisting only of
the final differentia, without abandoning the idea that the genus and differentiae are
elements of a definition. It is unclear, however, whether this conclusion also follows
from statement (vii). We have good reason to think that Aristotle’s argument works
81My view here follows that of Bostock: “Aristotle first points to the fact [...] that we can always
regard the initial genus, taken together with some of the differentiae following it, as forming a
subgenus. [...] The moral of this would appear to be that the complex case of a genus followed
by many differentiae can be reduced to the simple case of a genus followed by a single differentia,
namely by taking all of the definition except the final differentia as introducing a (narrow) genus”
(1994, 180 f.).
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on the basis of (vi), but is he also arguing that genus is matter?
This question is a point of deep disagreement in Aristotle scholarship, for, among
other reasons, on it rests in part the larger question of the unity of the Metaphysics.
In particular, Aristotle treats the issue of the unity of definition once again in VIII.6,
this time without specifically addressing definition by division, but rather the unity
of the object of definition.82 In this chapter Aristotle’s solution to the problem seems
to rest on a distinction, not mentioned in VII.12, between potency and actuality.
Though the question of unity may arise “if people proceed thus in their usual manner
of definition and speech,” it will no longer present a problem “if, as we say, one
element is matter and another form (μορφή), and one is potentially and the other
actually” (1045a21–24; tr. Ross). It follows that the union of form and matter
constitutes a unity since “the proximate matter and the form are one and the same
thing, the one potentially, the other actually” (b18–19). Unlike the account given in
VII.12, this account does not seem to rely on claim (iv), that definition is made of up
differentiae, or claim (v), that an ordered class of entailing differentiae is reducible
to its last member.
Many competing interpretations of the relationship between VII.12 and VIII.6
have cropped up, but each face certain challenges. Deslauriers, for instance, argues
that VII.12 and VIII.6 are consistent because in VII.12 Aristotle identifies the genus
with matter. Because the genus is matter, it is potentially what the defined species
(form) is actually, so the unity of genus and species (or, more precisely, the unity
of genus and final differentia) explicated in the VII.12 corresponds with the unity
of matter and form explicated in VIII.6.83 It follows on this view that Aristotle
82For this reading, see Harte 1996.
83See Deslauriers (2007, 137): “The connection between the solutions of 7.12 and of 8.6 to the
problem of unity is the identification of the genus in the definition with the matter in the thing,
through their role as potentially what the whole is actually. The difference in the approaches of
7.12 and 8.6 is the difference between thinking of the parts of definition in their logical relation to
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considers the genus, qua matter, to be included in the definition. But this seems to
contradict the claim of VII.11 that bare essences and forms lack matter (1037a1–2).
For if the defining account of a substance includes matter, what it signifies also will
include matter. And if, as we have been supposing, the object of definition is a form,
which is identical to its essence, it follows that form and essence possess matter.
Thus, on this view, VII.12 and VII.11 offer competing accounts of whether form and
essence possess matter. Some scholars, wishing to avoid this commitment to matter
as an element of definition, have suggested that the two chapters are incongruous,
and have argued that only one should be understood as representing Aristotle’s
mature and considered view of the problem. Bostock has argued that VIII.6 should
be favored as Aristotle’s definitive position on the unity of definition.84 This view
holds, however, only at the cost of denying the unity of the Metaphysics, and indeed
of chapter VII itself.85 I do not wish to claim that these considerations are decisive,
only that serious consequences attend either view.
Since the question of the relationship between VII.12 and VIII.6 is plainly beyond
the scope of the present study, let us pass it over in order to return to the problem of
the unity of definitions arising from division. On any account of Aristotle’s ultimate
answer to this problem, Aristotle is committed the thesis that a definition possesses
one another, as genus and species, and thinking of the parts of definition as representing the parts
of the object of definition, i.e. the parts of the essence, in which case the relation between the parts
is analogous to the relation between the parts of the composite substance: matter and form.”
84Bostock suggests that VII.12 was an early editor’s addition to book VII that was placed after
chapter 11 because that chapter introduces the topic of 12 and because 12 seemed to provide “the
more complete treatment” of the unity of definition (1994, 176). He continues: “[VIII.6] might
well appear to be even more fragmentary than [VII.12], and therefore better relegated to the end.
Nevertheless, I think it is clear that [VIII.6] is in fact the more mature treatment” (177). Bostock
argues that “the solution recommended in [VII.12] is rejected in PA I as impossible in practice, and
rejected in [VIII.6] as mistaken in principle, since it employs an inadequate conception of what a
definition is [i.e., one based on division]. It is a relatively early attempt, and one that Aristotle
himself discarded” (184).
85Devereux has argued to the contrary that VII.10–11, in which chapters matter is appears to be
excluded from definitions, represents Aristotle’s mature view of definition, while book VIII reflects
an earlier view. See his 2009, 23–32.
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unity in virtue of the relationship between the elements of a definition. He argues
that a definition arrived at through proper division—a division conforming to the
three criteria of MD*—will be one because it consists of a single predicate, the final
differentia of the definiendum. Aristotle will argue in VIII.6 that this solution is not
available to those who maintain an ontology of abstract Forms because, on such a
view, the object of definition is not sufficiently unified. In the next section, we will
turn to consider this polemic against the Forms, and in particular how it is connected
to Aristotle’s methodological disagreement with the practitioners of MD.
4.3 The critique of the Forms in Met. VIII.6
We have been considering Aristotle’s demand for the unity of definitions, and how
this condition might be met on a suitable account of division. For Aristotle, a
definition is an account of a thing’s essence—what it is to be that thing. Essence
strictly speaking only belongs to substance, conceived either as an individual object
or the form of an individual object. On either conception a substance is an inherently
unified subject. In accounting for the essence of a substance, then, definitions must
signify the intrinsic unity of the substance it defines. This presents a problem for
the Method of Division, for the definitions it yields consist of many parts, including
a genus and a set of differentiae. Aristotle’s solution to this problem, as we saw, is
that, in a proper division, the complex account consisting of a genus and a set of
differentiae is reducible to just one term, the final differentia.
This solution depends on at least two principles of natural kinds and definition.
The first principle is that there is a chain of predication relations obtaining between
a set of properly ordered differentiae such that the highest differentia is predicated of
all the lower differentiae and the lowest differentia partakes of the account of all the
higher differentiae. This chain of entailment is codified as a the second criterion for
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proper division on MD*. A lower differentia, moreover, will partake of the higher
only if it is a non-accidental quality of it—that is, if it is a quality of the differentia in
itself, and not merely incidentally. Thus, the partaking relation on which the second
criterion for MD* is premised relies crucially on Aristotle’s distinction between
accidental and substantial predication. The second principle is that a genus does
not exist outside of its species. In other words, every member of a genus must be a
member of some species. It follows on the basis of these principles that a definition
consisting only of the final differentia entails the genus and all the superordinate
differentiae that uniquely identify the definiendum.
These principles are peculiar to Aristotle’s understanding of natural kinds and
genus-species relations. Recall that for Aristotle a species is an indivisible kind pop-
ulated by individual substances compounded of form and matter. These individual
substances are distinct in virtue of possessing different material components, but
each has a token of the same form, and so admits of the same defining account that
identifies the particular nature of their respective species. Each of these species is
a member of a larger, divisible kind or genus. The species that populate the genus
are logically related in that the definition of the former will include an account of
the latter, in addition to qualitative differentia(e) that identify a species as a unique
member of the genus. The members of a species are individual substances, as is the
form they share, and as such each member is a unified whole. Thus, any adequate
account of a substance will explain how it is a ‘one’ and a ‘this’. In accounting for
the essence of a substance the unity of the definition must parallel the unity of its
object.
MD*, to the extent that it systematizes these two principles into a procedure
for formulating definitions, embodies Aristotle’s commitment to the unity of form.
Thus, the solution to the problem of unity of definitions by division offered in VII.12
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is informed by his view of form as a unity developed in the preceding chapters. This
solution, Aristotle thinks, is unavailable to a view of form that does not make use
of these principles. One such view is the Platonic ontology of abstract Forms. In
VIII.6, Aristotle raises an objection to Platonic ontology, arguing that this view
cannot account for the unity of form:
A definition is an account which is not one by being bundled together,
like the Iliad, but by dealing with one thing. Then what is it that makes
human being one; why is it one and not many—for instance, animal and
two-footed—especially if, as some say, there is an animal itself and a biped
itself? Why is human being not these themselves, so that human beings
would exist not by participation (κατὰ μέθεξιν) in human being, not in
one [Form], but in two, animal and biped? And generally human being
would not be one but more than one, animal and biped. (1045a12–20)
The problematic connection between the solutions to the problem of unity of def-
inition given in VII.12 and VIII.6 has been discussed; suffice it to say that, for
definitions arising from MD*, the question Aristotle raises here—“what is it that
makes human being one”?—has been adequately addressed in VII.12. This difficulty
aside, Aristotle contends in this passage that this problem is particularly acute on a
Platonic ontology of abstract Forms.
As I understand it, Aristotle’s argument against the Platonist may be outlined
as follows: A definition possesses unity if its definiendum possesses unity. Then the
definition of, say, human being possesses unity if its object, (the form of) human
being, possesses unity. Now, the definition of human being is composed of many
parts; let us say the parts are ‘animal’ and ‘two-footed’. If these parts do not
constitute a unity, then neither does (the form of) human being. In VII.12 Aristotle
indicates that the genus ‘animal’ can be one with the differentia ‘two-footed’ if it
does not exist outside of its species, or rather, if it only exists as some differentiated
kind of animality. On the Platonic view, however, the Form Human Being is what it
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is in virtue of its association with the independent Forms Animal and Two-Footed.
Thus, aside from any differentiated form of animality, there is Animal itself and,
likewise, Two-Footed itself. But then there will be no substantial unity between
these components of the definition of human being, for ‘two-footed’ does not indicate
a kind of animality, but a distinct and independent Form. If this is the case then,
insofar as they make up the one Form Human Being, these two Forms taken together
are identical with the one. It follows that if, as on the Platonic view (see § 2.2),
individual human beings are what they are by sharing in the form embodied in the
eidetic Human Being, it could just as easily be the case that human beings are what
they are in virtue of sharing in the two independent Forms that, taken together,
are identical to Human Being. In other words, Aristotle argues that Human Being
collapses into the Forms that constitute its definition.86 But in that case Human
Being would not embody a single form at all, but two.87
If Aristotle’s argument is sound, it challenges the basis of Platonic definition. For
Plato, as for Aristotle, the object of definition is a natural kind. On the former’s view,
a class constitutes a natural kind just in case its members share a common nature
that is embodied in an abstract Form. The definition consists in an enumeration of
the Forms that connect the definiendum to the largest kind of which it is a part. But
if the Form corresponding to a natural kind—in this case the kind human being—
collapses into the Forms that make up its definition, then what is being defined is not
a natural kind at all, but a class of objects that share in two distinct Forms. And,
86My interpretation here owes much to Harte’s: “...if the definition of man is ‘biped animal’
and if there are two Platonic forms, animality and bipedality, then the putative single form, man,
should surely be identified with these two forms. [... I]t then follows from this first difficulty that
individual men will be men not in virtue of participating in a single form, man, but rather through
their participation in the two forms, animality and bipedality, with which the putative single form
has been identified” (1996, 281).
87Aristotle gives a very similar argument in VII.14. There he tries to point out difficulties of the
idea that Animal itself, though it participates in a number of other Forms, e.g. Horse and Human
Being, is nevertheless one.
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as Plato acknowledges in the discussion of the class of barbarians in the Statesman
(262c–263a), such a class falls short of constituting a natural kind. But the argument
does not hinge on the definiendum being the kind human being. The implication is
very general: Aristotle is pointing out a problem for the relationship between the
Platonic conception of form and definition.
The argument also presents a challenge to Platonic division (MD). Definitions
arising from MD consist in a weaving-together of the steps of the division—i.e., the
intermediate kinds that connect the definiendum to the largest kind of which it is
a part—and as such are made of a plurality of parts. If Aristotle is right to insist
that the definition of a unified entity ought to account for its unity, then there is
no reason on the basis of a definition by MD to suppose that its object is a unified
whole. In that case, it is clear why Aristotle would remark in the Posterior Analytics
discussion of MD that, on this method of definition, “there is no necessity that what
is predicated becomes a unity, but it could be just as if the same person were both
musical and literate” (92a29–33). On his view, a Platonic definition does not account
for why the components of a definition of a natural kind constitute an intrinsic unity.
Hence, as the argument of VIII.6 is meant to show, there is no reason to suppose
that the kind defined does in fact possess a natural unity—it could just as easily be
the case that a human being (for instance) is what she is in virtue of sharing in a
plurality of forms.
Of course, Aristotle thinks that this objection against the Method of Division
can be circumvented if one revises the rules for proper division. In particular, proper
division should acknowledge the distinction between accidental and non-accidental
predicates, dividing only by the latter predicates so that the differentiae obtained
actually figure into the defining account of the definiendum. To avoid the difficulty
Aristotle presents in VIII.6, the Platonist needs to give the same analysis of succes-
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sive differentiation premised on a distinction between accidental and non-accidental
predicates. This is an analysis that Plato might be able to give, but there is another
obstacle to meeting the unity condition for definition. If a Form like Animal can
exist independently of any particular kind of animal, then Plato is faced with the
more basic problem of how to account for the unity of the Form corresponding to
‘two-footed animal’ without compromising the unity of it or the Forms composing it.
If indeed this is a problem the Platonist must address, it will require a substantial
reevaluation of the Platonic notion of a natural kind, and in particular the sort of
relations that obtain between natural kinds. And at least in Aristotle’s opinion, such
a revision cannot be made without giving up the idea that the specific nature that
unifies a natural kind is embodied in an independent and wholly unified Form.
4.4 Epilogue: Division and Aristotle’s critique of Platonism
It is immaterial to the present discussion whether Aristotle’s argument is in fact a
sound indictment of Platonic natural kinds. What is important to this discussion is
that, if the above analysis of the argument against the Forms of VIII.6 is correct,
we have good reason to think that Aristotle’s methodological critique of Platonic
division is part of a larger critique of the Platonic ontology of Forms.
For both Plato and Aristotle, the object of definition is a natural kind. On
both accounts a natural kind possesses a unity in virtue of its members possessing a
common form, though they differ in how they account for this unity. For Aristotle,
the definition of a natural kind accounts for its unity in virtue of possessing an
intrinsic unity. The components of the definition are related by a partaking relation
on which the last differentia of the definiendum entails the genus and the intermediate
differentiae that uniquely identify it. Accordingly, he devises rules for division on
which this relation is preserved and, hence, on which the resulting definition possesses
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the requisite unity. To the contrary, for Plato the unity of a natural kind is accounted
for in the unity of its corresponding Form. MD exploits this property of natural
kinds in formulating definitions. The part-whole relations among kinds established
through division map onto ontological connections among the corresponding Forms.
Aristotle’s critique of MD is meant to present problems for this conception. He
argues that, on this procedure, we are given no reason to suppose that the complex
of kinds that compose a definition by division should constitute the definition of
a single, unified kind. Because there is an intrinsic connection between the Forms
included in the definiens, it could just as well be the case that the kind defined is
not unified under a single Form but under the complex of Forms that comprise its
definition. If it is not the case that a natural kind consists in a class whose members
share a common form typified in one abstract Form, it seems that MD will fail in
formulating true defining accounts of natural kinds.
Thus, despite their agreement that the object of definition is a natural kind, their
methodological disagreement on the Method of Division reflects deep disparities be-
tween Plato’s and Aristotle’s respective metaphysical theories. Aristotle’s account of
genus-species relations, which is so crucial to this account of definition, is inconsistent
with an account of forms as independent entities. Were Aristotle to follow Plato in
maintaining this thesis, he would not have been able to claim in VII.12 that a genus
does not exist outside of its species. Yet this claim is crucial to this account of the
unity of definition. On this understanding, MD is ill-suited to the task of definition
insofar as it fails to explain the intrinsic unity that for Aristotle must obtain between
the elements of a definition. Similarly, Plato’s account of a true statement as one
making a predication that corresponds to actual relations among the Forms depends
on his thesis that the Forms are independent yet interrelated entities. On the Pla-
tonic ontology, therefore,MD* might seem too strong: the unity of a natural kind is
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guaranteed by its corresponding Form, so to require that the complex of Forms that
comprise its definition possess an intrinsic unity is either impossible or unnecessary.
The inconsistency of MD and MD*, in other words, may in part be explained by
the inconsistency of Plato’s and Aristotle’s respective accounts of a natural kind.
These observations agree with some earlier accounts of Aristotle’s critique of
division. Balme,88 for instance, understands Platonic division to lack the formal
notions that Aristotle would attribute to kinds. But this is because Plato, on his view,
was interested in division primarily as a method for assigning each thing to its proper
kind. As the preceding discussion suggests, the purpose of this activity is to define
each thing according to the Form in which it shares. Aristotle’s rejection of Platonic
division as “accidental” division arises out of his rejection of the Platonic theory of
Forms. In order to account for the essential nature of objects, as opposed to those
attributes that belong incidentally to an object, Aristotle introduces the notion of
substantial and accidental predicates. Accordingly, division must be concerned only
with the essential attributes of its object. For Balme, then, Aristotle’s objections to
MD have a primarily ontological basis. Deslauriers89 has a different, but in many
ways complimentary, view of Aristotle critique of MD. On this account, the principle
disagreement between Plato and Aristotle lies in the kind of knowledge garnered
through division. For Plato, as we saw, the knowledge of definitions constitutes the
highest form of knowledge—knowledge of the nature of the Forms. For Aristotle,
however, knowledge of definitions is only the starting point for scientific knowledge;
definitions give us the ‘that’, but we need scientific demonstration to obtain the
‘why’. Accordingly, Aristotle criticizes MD for failing as a method of scientific
demonstration.
88See Balme 1987, esp, 69–80.
89See Deslauriers 1990 and 2007, esp. Ch. 1.
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The view presented in the preceding sections has the virtue of illustrating both
perspectives of Aristotle’s criticism. We saw that there are two components to Aris-
totle’s criticism of MD, one logical, the other ontological. The logical considerations
that led Aristotle to reject MD as a procedure for logical deduction and scientific
demonstration focus on its failure to deduce conclusions that are necessary conse-
quences of its premises. The ontological component, on the other hand, focuses on
MD’s failure to account for the unity of the object of definition. Aristotle’s rejection
of the Platonic theory of Forms is a central component of his claim that MD fails to
account for the unity of definition, and his rejection of the Platonic idea that knowl-
edge of definitions is a central component of his claim that MD fails as a method
of logical deduction and scientific demonstration. Still, it might be wondered which
of these two components of Aristotle’s critique is more basic. As the views outlined
above attest, there is something to be said in favor of either view. But this is a topic
for a different study.
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